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Abstract
Much has been written recently about the problems for emerging markets that might result
from a mismatch between foreign-currency denominated liabilities and assets (or income ￿ ows)
denominated in local currency. In particular, several models, developed in the aftermath of
￿nancial crises of the late 1990s, suggest that the expansion in the ￿peso￿ value of ￿dollar￿
liabilities resulting from a devaluation could, via a net-worth e⁄ect, o⁄set the expansionary
competitiveness e⁄ect. Assessing which e⁄ect dominates is ultimately an empirical matter. In
this vein, we construct a new database with accounting information (including the currency
composition of liabilities) for over 450 non-￿nancial ￿rms in ￿ve Latin American countries. We
estimate, at the ￿rm level, the reduced-form e⁄ect on investment of holding foreign-currency-
denominated debt during an exchange-rate realignment. We consistently ￿nd that, contrary
to the predicted sign of the net-worth e⁄ect, ￿rms holding more dollar debt do not invest less
than their counterparts in the aftermath of a depreciation. We show that this result is due to
￿rms matching the currency denomination of their liabilities with the exchange rate sensitivity
of their pro￿ts. Because of this matching, the negative balance sheet e⁄ects of a depreciation
on ￿rms holding dollar debt are o⁄set by the larger competitiveness gains of these ￿rms.
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zResearch Economist, Inter-American Development Bank, kevinco@iadb.org.The emerging-market ￿nancial crises of the late 1990s have challenged the old view of ￿nancial
crises as having purely macroeconomic causes. None of the governments in these countries was
turning to the printing press to cover budget de￿cits, the mechanism behind ￿￿rst generation￿
models of crises. Moreover, there were no large output gaps that might have signaled a future
need to devalue, as in ￿second generation￿models. As a result, a new view has emerged in which
the emphasis has shifted away from government-level and macro variables to ￿rm-level ￿nancial
variables and to the interaction of these variables with aggregate shocks.
Proponents of this view include Radelet and Sachs (1998) who argue that excessive reliance on
short-term debt left emerging-market corporations vulnerable to ￿￿nancial panic￿as described by
Diamond and Dybvig (1983). For McKinnon and Pill (1998), on the other hand, it was excessive
foreign borrowing by domestic banks that led to the crisis after the government withdrew its implicit
guarantees. A third group of studies identi￿es debt denominated in foreign currency as the key
protagonist behind these crises. At center stage in these studies is the drop in ￿net worth￿that
results from the interaction of a depreciation and a currency mismatch between liabilities and
income at the ￿rm level. This deterioration in balance sheets, holding all else ￿xed, makes ￿rms
appear to be riskier investments. Accordingly, creditors require higher rates of return and/or limit
the amount of new debt issued to these ￿rms. This, in turn, causes a contraction of investment
by dollar-indebted ￿rms following a exchange rate depreciation. The key mechanism, therefore, is
that a depreciation in￿ ates the peso value of dollar debt and the resulting weakening of balance
sheet positions prevents ￿rms from investing and expanding.1
Despite the prominent role attributed to foreign-currency debt in recent ￿nancial crises, there
is scarce empirical evidence documenting the detrimental e⁄ects of currency exposure on ￿rm-level
investment during these crises.2 The present study addresses this question directly. We construct
a new database with accounting information (including the currency composition of liabilities) for
approximately 500 publicly traded non-￿nancial ￿rms in ￿ve Latin American countries: Argentina,
Brazil, Chile, Colombia, and Mexico. These data cover most of the large economies of Latin
America for the period 1990 to 1999, a period of substantial exchange rate volatility for many of
these countries. In addition, there are ￿rms in our sample that hold substantial amounts of foreign-
currency debt. These elements constitute the two ingredients necessary for testing the proposed
mechanism. Our choice of publicly listed ￿rms is determined exclusively by the availability of data
on the currency composition of debt. We concentrate on the non-￿nancial sector of the economy,
as it is here that investment decisions are ultimately carried out.3
Using this data set, we examine the behavior of ￿rm investment. We investigate the response
of ￿xed-capital investment to better understand how the proposed mechanisms might a⁄ect the
productive capacity of the ￿rm in the medium term. On the other hand, it has also been argued
that falling net worth not only a⁄ects the supply of long-term credit for investment, but it also
1As it is common usage in the literature on foreign-currency assets and liabilities, we use the term ￿dollar debt￿
to refer to any liability denominated in a foreign currency. With similar aplomb, we refer to debt denominated in the
domestic currency as ￿peso debt.￿
2Both Mitton (2002) and Lemmon and Lins (2003) ￿nd that ￿rms in East Asia that were more leveraged (without
regard to currency) saw steeper declines in their stock values following the large exchange-rate depreciations of the
1990s. Moreover, Allayannis, Brown and Klapper (2001) show that market capitalizations dropped more for East
Asian ￿rms holding larger shares of unhedged foreign-currency debt. On the other hand, Conesa-Labastida (1997)
and Martinez and Werner (2002) examine determinants of the currency composition of debt in Mexican corporations,
but do not consider its interaction with exchange-rate movements or the impact on corporate investment.
3However, we do allow aggregate capital-market outcomes (such as bank credit) to enter exogenously into the
analysis of ￿rm-level investment.
1a⁄ects the availability of short-term working capital. A shortage of working capital reduces the
￿rm￿ s capacity to purchase intermediate goods and pay for variable factors of production, leading
to a reduction in output. To explore this channel, we also examine the behavior of inventory
investment.
Our speci￿c empirical strategy is to assess whether ￿rms with more dollar debt invest less in
the aftermath of a depreciation. We do so by estimating reduced-form equations for inventory and
￿xed-capital investment. The proposed mechanism centers on the interaction of dollar indebtedness
with shifts in the exchange rate, and so the key variable in our analysis is
(Dollar Debt)i;t￿1 ￿ (￿ln Exchange Rate)t.
This interaction e⁄ect can be thought of as having two components: a balance sheet channel
and a competitiveness channel. The latter refers to the potential income gains from a depreciation
for exporting ￿rms, or ￿rms operating in tradeable sectors. The manner in which these e⁄ects
combine depends on the manner in which dollar debt is distributed across ￿rms. More speci￿cally,
the key determinant of the sign of the overall e⁄ect is how strongly related the currency-composition
of debt is with the exchange rate sensitivity of pro￿ts at the ￿rm level. If, on average, this relation
is strongly positive, then we say that ￿rms are ￿currency matching￿their balance sheet with their
income stream. If this is the case, then the sign of the interaction will be ambiguous, as those ￿rms
holding higher shares of dollarized debt are also those ￿rms that see the largest increases in current
and future pro￿ts following a depreciation. If not, a depreciation leads to a (relative) reduction in
investment by dollar-indebted ￿rms.
Our main empirical result is that we fail to ￿nd a signi￿cant, negative coe¢ cient on this interac-
tion: dollar-indebted ￿rms do not invest less than their peso counterparts following a depreciation.
Indeed, for many plausible speci￿cations, we estimate a positive and statistically signi￿cant coe¢ -
cient. We argue that this result is due to the degree to which ￿rms match the currency composition
of their debt with the elasticity of their income to the exchange rate. In the wake of a depreciation,
the reduction of investment and output induced by the increase in indebtedness is more than o⁄set
by higher current and future earnings.
Accordingly, we ￿nd that, after a depreciation, earnings are higher in those ￿rms holding more
dollar debt. Lending additional support to this hypothesis, we ￿nd that, in our sample, dollarization
of liabilities is higher in ￿rms whose income we expect ex ante to be more positively correlated with
the real exchange rate (￿rms with tradable products, for example). Furthermore, our estimates of
the above interaction term drop substantially when we control for factors that proxy for the ￿rms￿
changing pro￿t opportunities. Therefore, the empirical ￿nding essentially results from omitted
variables ￿unobserved ￿rm level characteristics associated with a higher elasticity of income to
the exchange rate. We argue that this matching is the natural consequence of the risk aversion
that ￿rms will exhibit in the face of capital-market imperfections. By systematically matching the
exchange-rate sensitivities of their income statement and balance sheet, ￿rms are in e⁄ect hedging
some of the exchange-rate risk to which they are exposed.
The rest of the study is organized as follows. Section I contains a description of our sample and
variables. In Section II, we discuss the impact of dollar indebtedness on investment behavior, and
present our empirical strategy. In Section III, we present the main results of the study: relative to
corporations indebted in pesos, ￿rms holding dollar debt did not invest less following depreciations
of the domestic currency. We also show that this ￿nding is not sensitive to including a variety of
2￿rm-level controls, using alternative estimators, or examining speci￿c countries or episodes. We
then turn our attention to each of the two channels a⁄ecting ￿rm-level investment: competitiveness
(Section IV) and net worth (Section V). Section VI contains a discussion of our results in light of
complementary studies that have come to the fore in the past several years. Finally, section VII
concludes.
I Database
I.A Description of Data
This section describes our sample and variables. Our data consist of ￿rm-level accounting informa-
tion for non-￿nancial corporations in Argentina, Brazil, Colombia, Chile, and Mexico for the period
1990 to 1999. In addition, we have data describing the ￿rms￿main products, sectors in which they
operate, ownership, and a history of the main corporate events. Our main source of information is
the Bloomberg database on publicly traded ￿rms. Additionally, some data for Brazilian ￿rms and
all data for Argentine ￿rms come from a second dataset: EconomÆtica. Our choice of sources hinges
on the availability of balance sheet data that include a decomposition of liabilities by currency of
denomination.
For our estimates, we use a sample restricted to the non-￿nancial ￿rms for which foreign-
currency liability data are available. Table (1) shows the number of observations in the ￿nal sample
per country and year as well as descriptive statistics for the main variables we use. The size of the
sample changes as new ￿rms are listed and incorporated into the Bloomberg database. Bankrupt or
de-listed ￿rms are not removed from Bloomberg unless their ticker is adopted by another ￿rm. To
our knowledge, there are no ￿rms that are censored from our dataset for this reason. The decline
in the number of observations towards the end of the sample is due to changes in the reporting
requirements for foreign-currency debt, and not a result of bankruptcies.
[Insert Table 1 here]
Our main dependent variables are two measures of investment. The ￿rst is investment in ￿xed
capital, measured as net purchases of ￿xed assets. We opt not to use the change in net ￿xed
assets as a measure of investment because accounting standards in most of the countries in our
sample allow for revaluations of assets, making it impossible to separate investment from changes
in the accounting valuation of capital goods. The second is investment in inventories de￿ned as
the change in the stock of inventories in a given period. Inventories include raw materials, works
in progress, and ￿nished goods. In addition to investment, we also look at the e⁄ects of dollar debt
on two income variables: net sales and earnings from operating activities.
The central explanatory variable is foreign currency debt (D￿), the book value of foreign cur-
rency liabilities converted into the respective local currency. In all of the countries in our sample,
accounting standards dictate that conversion of debt from foreign to local currency values be carried
out using the exchange rate for the period in which the balance sheet is reported.4
4Accounting practices for Argentina, Brazil, and Mexico are described in Coopers and Lybrand (1993). Bavishi
(1995) contains descriptions of accounting practices in the remaining countries.
3To explore the relationship between investment and dollar debt we control for additional deter-
minants of investment. Our main group of controls includes direct and indirect measures of income
sales and operating costs. The ￿rst of these is earnings, de￿ned as earnings before accrued interest,
taxes, depreciation, and amortization (EBITDA). Cash ￿ ow measures used in the investment liter-
ature are usually net of interest expenses and taxes. However interest and tax payments are both
dependent on the ￿rm￿ s capital structure. Since we wish to identify the e⁄ects of leverage (and,
in particular, leverage in dollars) on investment, we follow Lang, Ofek and Stulz (1996) and use a
measure of earnings that does not depend on the ￿rm￿ s debt choice. The second income-related
control is a dummy variable that indicates whether the ￿rm has international operations. Inclu-
sion of this variable will allow us to explore the extent to which holding foreign assets a⁄ects the
currency composition of debt and the subsequent response in the event of a depreciation.
Finally, we control for di⁄erences in ￿rm ownership. Parent is a dummy variable that indicates
whether the ￿rm￿ s controlling interest is another ￿rm. This variable is motivated by studies of
internal capital markets, in which ownership by a conglomerate a⁄ects the availability of internal
funds for investment.5
We modify the original accounting data in four ways:
1. We in￿ ate all data to 1999 values using December-to-December changes in the consumer price
index (CPI), and convert them to U.S. dollars using the market exchange rate for December
of 1999.6
2. In the event of a merger, spin-o⁄, or split, we construct an arti￿cial ￿rm that contains all of
the component ￿rms for the entire sample period. When information on a component ￿rm
is not available, we drop the ￿rm from the sample. Ownership changes are reported under
corporate news in the Bloomberg database.
3. We drop all ￿rm/year observations if the accounting data are not self-consistent. In particular,
we drop observations if dollar liabilities exceed total liabilities or if accounting variables do
not accord with sign conventions. This results in the deletion of 10 observations.
4. We compute the change in total assets and construct a z-score using the sample mean and
standard deviation. We drop ￿rm/year observations that have jzj > 5. Twelve observations
are dropped because of this rule. Our results are not sensitive to this particular choice of the
threshold.
Because we are interested in the e⁄ects of a devaluation on ￿rms holding dollar debt we interact
D￿ with changes in real exchange rate, ￿e. Our de￿nition of e (nominal exchange rate against the
U.S. dollar scaled by the local CPI) is consistent with the in￿ ation adjustments described above.7
It is straightforward to show that using e on in￿ ation-adjusted values of debt is equivalent to using
the nominal exchange rate on current values. Note that according to this de￿nition, a devaluation
5We discuss the coding of this variable in Section III.B.1.
6We use consumer-price and exchange-rate data from the International Financial Statistics of the International
Monetary Fund.
7In all the speci￿cations we report, we measure ￿e as the Dec-to-Dec log change in the real exchange rate. Although
we do not report them, we obtain similar results if ￿e is measured as the log di⁄erence between the exchange rate
in December of the previous year and the average exchange rate in the current year, or as the average-to-average log
change.
4leads to a higher value of e. Also note, that because we do not have information on the exact
currency composition of foreign debt, our assumption throughout is that all foreign currency debt
is denominated in U.S. dollars. We believe this to be a reasonable approximation, as the volatility
of the currencies in our sample usually dominates any exchange-rate movements among creditor
currencies.
II Framework
II.A Dollar Debt and Balance Sheet E⁄ects
At about the same time as Robert Mundell was receiving the Nobel prize for economics, a series of
studies￿ inspired by the emerging-market crises of the late 1990s￿ seemed to be undercutting the
central assumption of the Mundell-Fleming model: that a depreciation of the exchange rate has an
expansionary e⁄ect for the macro-economy. This new view of depreciations is centered on the micro
level and pays particular attention to the (changing) credit constraints facing ￿rms during ￿nancial
crises. The key assumption of this literature is that the cost of external funds is decreasing in ￿rm
net worth. The second ingredient in these models is that some fraction of debt be denominated
in foreign currency. A depreciation, therefore, not only has the usual e⁄ects on aggregate demand
but also deteriorates net worth by in￿ ating the domestic-currency value of debt. Holding all else
￿xed, we expect that the higher indebtedness leads to an increase in the cost of external ￿nance
and to a reduction in investment. Krugman (1999a) presents a stylized version of this e⁄ect, while
Aghion, Bacchetta, and Banerjee (2001) and CØspedes, Chang, and Velasco (2004) incorporate this
mechanism into more fully articulated models.
The link described above between investment and net worth has been widely treated in a variety
of venues, including macroeconomics and corporate ￿nance. On the macro side of things, Bernanke
and Gertler (1989) and later Bernanke, Gertler and Gilchrist (1998) develop closed economy ￿￿nan-
cial accelerator￿models in which the premium on external credit is decreasing in net worth. In their
models, shocks to ￿rm productivity a⁄ect both marginal conditions (i.e., the ￿rst order conditions
for investment) and ￿rm net worth, and, therefore, bring about changes in output that are larger
than those implied by the neoclassical benchmark. Additionally, an extensive empirical literature
documents the e⁄ect of net worth on investment. Fazzari, Hubbard, and Petersen (1988), Hoshi,
Kashyap, and Scharfstein (1991), and many others provide evidence that investment is related to
the availability of internal funds (cash ￿ ow).8 Lang, Ofek, and Stulz (1996) show that there is a
negative relation between investment and ￿rm leverage.9
Explanations of why ￿rms choose to hold dollar debt in the ￿rst place typically include a failure
of uncovered interest rate parity (UIP). Several explanations has been put forward for a lower
ex ante dollar rate. One set of models posits that dollarized debt entitles the creditor to larger
8Hubbard (1997) carries out an exhaustive survey of the literature on capital market imperfections and investment.
9There is also substantial evidence for the role of net worth on ￿rm-level investment in developing countries.
Individual country studies include Gelos and Werner (1998) who look at the e⁄ect of cash ￿ ow and collateral (proxied
by land values) on investment in Mexican manufacturing ￿rms; Gallego and Loayza (2000) who look at the role of
cash ￿ ows and debt overhang on publicly traded Chilean ￿rms; and Harris, Schiantarelli, and Siregar (1994) who look
at a sample of Indonesian ￿rms. Laeven (2000) and Love (2003) carry out similar exercises on a panel of data from
emerging economies.
5payments in periods of default, lowering the required interest rate on dollar loans.10 In another
set of models (Jeanne 1999a, 1999b), foreign-currency debt lowers interest rates by reducing moral
hazard and signaling problems. In Calvo (1999, 2001), the failure of uncovered interest parity
can be attributed to the interaction of information asymmetries and regulatory restrictions on the
banking sector and to the costs of forming devaluation expectations, which are then included in
the price of peso debt.11
Finally, a series of authors argue that dollar debt is often the ￿safest￿form of ￿nancing (or
saving) in emerging markets. Eichengreen and Haussman (1999) stress that in the absence of a
long-term local currency market ￿rms are willing to take on exchange-rate risk to avoid the interest-
rate risk inherent in short-term peso liabilities. Ize and Levy-Yeyati (2004) argue that a history
of bad monetary policy in emerging markets causes investors to place a premium on peso debt,
regardless of contemporary policy. In these economies investors favour dollar-denominated debt
contracts because they provide partial insurance against unexpected in￿ ation.
Following a movement in the exchange rate, three main mechanisms will a⁄ect the investment
decision of a ￿rm holding dollar debt:
1. The peso value of dollar debt will change, altering the value of total debt,
2. internal funds available for investment will be a⁄ected because of changes in current pro￿ts
and
3. shifts in relative prices will change the marginal product of capital.
The ￿rst two mechanisms will immediately a⁄ect the ￿rm￿ s net worth, and, in the presence of
￿nancial frictions, will a⁄ect investment by altering the cost of capital. The third mechanism will
a⁄ect demand for capital by altering current and future marginal returns on investment. The net
result of these three e⁄ects on investment is ambiguous and will depend on the size of inherited
dollar debt, the sensitivity of the risk premium on external funds to changes in ￿rm leverage and the
on the impact of the real exchange rate on current and future pro￿ts12. To simplify the discussion,
we will refer to the e⁄ect of the exchange rate on dollar debt (the ￿rst mechanism mentioned above)
as the balance sheet e⁄ect13. The next two mechanisms mentioned above are both part of what we
will call the competitiveness e⁄ect, i.e., the e⁄ect of the exchange rate on current and future pro￿ts.
Therefore, ￿rm net worth will be a⁄ected by both the balance sheet e⁄ect and, via current pro￿ts,
by the competitiveness e⁄ect.
If dollar debt is distributed randomly across the economy, then we would expect ￿rms with
higher levels of inherited dollar debt to have a lower (and possibly negative) elasticity of investment
10For Schneider and Tornell (2004), this takes place within the banking sector, where bailouts to dollar-indebted
banks accompany devaluations. Chamon (2001), on the other hand, argues that when defaults are correlated with
depreciations, holders of dollar debt bene￿t from the fact that they are entitled to a larger share of the liquidated
assets.
11Regulatory constraints on currency mismatch encourage foreign banks to lend in their own currency, and, as
a result, they charge a premium on peso rates. Similar regulatory constraints force domestic banks to match dol-
lar deposits with dollar loans. Because of information advantages, these banks have incentives to place this debt
domestically, leading to a lower equilibrium rate on dollar loans.
12For a formal articulation of this investment problem at the ￿rm level, see Bleakley and Cowan (2002).
13Strictly speaking the ￿rm￿ s balance sheet will be a⁄ected by both the changing value of liabilities and the e⁄ect
of current earnings on assets. We choose to ignore this second mechanism simply for expositional reasons, as most of
the literature emphasizes the interaction between liabilities and the exchange rate.
6to movements in the exchange rate. If, on the other hand, ￿rms match income streams with
the currency composition of liabilities, then those ￿rms that we observe holding higher levels of
dollarized liabilities will also be those ￿rms whose pro￿ts respond most favorably to a depreciation.
This being the case, it is uncertain whether ￿rms holding dollar debt will invest relatively less than
their counterparts following a depreciation, as the negative impact of increasing indebtedness will
be o⁄set by rising current and future pro￿ts.
II.B Law of Motion for Debt
The central empirical question of the present study is how the changing exchange rate interacts with
inherited dollar-denominated liabilities on the ￿rm￿ s balance sheet to alter the ￿rm￿ s investment
behavior. Therefore, the key explanatory variable in our analysis is the interaction of lagged dollar
debt, D￿
i;t￿1, with the log change in the real exchange rate, ￿et.
A simple way to motivate this interaction term is to write down the law of motion for total debt,
expressed in terms of in￿ ation-adjusted pesos. We start by considering the movement of nominal
balance sheet variables over time. Dollar debt, D￿
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Similarly, for peso-denominated debt we have
Dt = Dt￿1￿t(1 + rt￿1) ￿ DSt + DNt; (3)
where ￿t is a factor that allows for the indexation of domestic-currency debt. As before, we
transform the equation into period-T units, and maintain the assumption that interest is paid
completely each period14:
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where all lowercase variables correspond to logs. The ￿rst term on the right-hand side is the one of
14We lift the assumption of full debt servicing in later sections.
7interest. The real value of the ￿rm￿ s debt rises if it holds foreign-currency debt and the exchange
rate goes up faster than the domestic-price level. This is, of course, a purely mechanical e⁄ect.
The second term indicates that domestic-currency debt can be ￿in￿ ated away,￿albeit at a slower
pace if the debt is indexed to the local-price level. Moreover, by interacting (￿￿1) ~ Dt￿1￿cpit with
country dummies, we allow the average degree of debt indexation to vary across countries. Finally,
it is clear that net issues of new debt will also change the ￿rm￿ s level of debt holdings. This latter
term is endogenous, so we focus only on the autonomous component in our empirical work15.
II.C Empirical Methodology
As argued above, the key explanatory variable in our analysis is the interaction of lagged dollar
debt, D￿
i;t￿1, with the change in the real exchange rate, ￿et. This interaction corresponds to the
di⁄erential e⁄ect of a depreciation on ￿rms with varying levels of dollarized debt. We also argued
above that predictions for the sign of this derivative are ambiguous, and will depend on the extent
to which ￿rms match the currency composition of their income with that of their liabilities. The
estimated sign of this coe¢ cient should indicate whether the large (negative) balance sheet e⁄ects
of a depreciation on ￿rms holding high levels of dollarized debt are o⁄set by a larger (positive)
competitiveness e⁄ect in these ￿rms.
In addition to interaction e⁄ects, we also include lagged foreign-currency-denominated debt
and country ￿ year ￿xed e⁄ects. Including the main e⁄ect of dollar debt absorbs any pre-existing
di⁄erences among ￿rms with di⁄erent levels of dollar indebtedness. Such di⁄erences might have
prevailed in the absence of movements in the real exchange rate, e.g., if expanding ￿rms were
more likely to issue dollar debt than stagnant ones. The aggregate main e⁄ect, a ￿xed e⁄ect for
country ￿ year, captures the macroeconomic changes that may impact all ￿rms in the economy
without regard to the currency composition of their balance sheet.
The basic speci￿cation (for ￿rm i in country j at year t) that results is
Yijt = ￿(D￿
i;j;t￿1 ￿ ￿ejt) + ￿D￿
i;j;t￿1 + ￿jt + "ijt (7)
where Yijt is the ￿rm-level outcome, typically investment. This empirical framework allows us to
estimate the result of holding dollar debt during an exchange rate realignment. It bears mentioning
that this is not measuring a causal e⁄ect, but instead the result of a combination of one causal
factor￿ the e⁄ect from increases in the peso value of debt￿ and other changes in ￿nancial and
capital-demand factors that happen to be correlated with the currency composition of the ￿rm￿ s
debt. To equation (7), we also add additional ￿rm and macroeconomic control variables. These
are detailed below.
We estimate this equation using Ordinary Least Squares (OLS) on the accounting data described
above. Note that investment is therefore modeled as a function of predetermined micro-level vari-
15Holding foreign-currency debt during an exchange rate realignment similarly a⁄ects the interest charges incurred
by the ￿rm. The ￿rm￿ s debt service in constant pesos is as follows:
￿
~ DSt + ~ DS￿
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￿














The rD terms re￿ ect the usual charges for interest. The remaining terms represent the ￿revaluation￿ e⁄ects that
come from changing relative prices over time, as seen in equation 5 as well.




Firms in our sample that hold dollar debt do not invest less than peso-indebted ￿rms in the period
following a depreciation. To show this, we employ the empirical methodology detailed above, and
pay particular attention to the estimated coe¢ cient on the interaction of lagged dollar debt and
the change in the exchange rate, (D￿ ￿ ￿e). Systematically, we fail to ￿nd a signi￿cant negative
coe¢ cient: dollar-indebted ￿rms do not invest relatively less following a depreciation. Indeed,
we often ￿nd exactly the opposite: ￿rms with dollar debt invest signi￿cantly more following a
depreciation than peso indebted ￿rms.
We focus on two types of investment: investment in ￿xed capital and investment in inventories.
These are both important components of business-cycle ￿ uctuations, but re￿ ect very di⁄erent
types of investment activity and are likely to respond di⁄erently to crisis-induced shifts in credit
and demand conditions. Investment in inventories is a relatively short-term a⁄air. The ratio of
inventory to sales in our sample is such that a product in the pipeline will typically be gone in under
two months. Investing in the accumulation of inventories is likely to be sensitive to the availability
of working capital, short-term ￿nancing that is often secured internally or through trade credit
o⁄ered by input suppliers. On the other hand, investment in ￿xed capital plays out over a much
longer horizon, and has to do with the long-term expansion of the productive capacity of the ￿rm.
[Insert Table 2 here]
Table (2) presents estimates of the reduced-form e⁄ect on investment of holding dollar debt
during a depreciation. Columns (1)-(5) contain the results for ￿xed-capital investment, whereas in
Columns (6)-(10), we present estimates for inventory investment. We report the e⁄ect on current-
year investment in Panel A, whereas Panel B contains results where investment for the following
year is the dependent variable. (Note that all the micro-level variables are lagged one year, so
￿current year￿ means contemporaneous with the macro variable. For Panel B, the dependent
variable is from period t + 1 and the lagged dependent variable is therefore from period t.).
The regressions summarized in columns (1) and (6) include only the principal ￿rst-order e⁄ect
and, of course, the interaction term: dollar debt times the change in the exchange rate. We do
not obtain a negative coe¢ cient estimate for the (D￿ ￿ ￿e) coe¢ cient in any of the four regres-
sions. In fact, in three of the speci￿cations we obtain positive point estimates that are signi￿cantly
di⁄erent from zero at conventional con￿dence levels. Following periods of real depreciation, invest-
ment by dollar-indebted ￿rms is not signi￿cantly lower than the investment of their peso indebted
counterparts.
This result is robust to the inclusion of a variety of additional controls. First, we add total debt
to the speci￿cation. Next, we control for possible indexation of peso debt. Based on the law of
motion of debt (equation 5) we add
P
j (1 ￿ ￿)j Di;t￿1￿cpij;t to the speci￿cation, in which Di;t￿1is
9lagged peso debt (as before) and cpij;t is the log of the local price level. Using country-speci￿c ￿0s
allows the speci￿cation to accommodate di⁄erent countries￿use of indexed debt. In columns (4)
and (9), we add the interaction of total debt with the change in the exchange rate to control for the
di⁄erences in investment behavior of more highly leveraged ￿rms in periods following a currency
depreciation. None of these three changes leads to substantial changes in the estimated (D￿ ￿￿e)
coe¢ cient, although in some speci￿cations the estimated coe¢ cient turns statistically insigni￿cant.
Finally, recognizing that ￿rms may face substantial adjustment costs when changing their levels of
￿xed capital, columns (5) and (10) include the lagged dependent variable as an additional regressor.
As expected, including the lagged dependent variable does lead to some changes in the estimated
coe¢ cients on the dollar-debt/exchange-rate interaction. In all cases, however, we fail to obtain a
negative and signi￿cant coe¢ cient estimate for (D￿ ￿ ￿e).
To corroborate our results, we can compare our estimate of the e⁄ect of leverage reported in
column (2), (4) and (5) with those from other studies that have estimated ￿rm level investment
in developing countries. Harris, Schiantarelli, and Siregar (1994) look at a sample of 520 listed
and non-listed manufacturing ￿rms in Indonesia for the period 1981 to 1988. For 1985 to 1988,
the period in which the authors argue administrative control of credit was replaced by market
assignment, they ￿nd that the coe¢ cient on debt is between -0.025 and -0.018 for small ￿rms
(depending on the estimation technique) and actually positive for large ￿rms. Gallego and Loayza
(2000) carry out a similar exercise using 79 listed ￿rms in Chile over the period 1985 to 1995.
For the full sample, they ￿nd a coe¢ cient on leverage of -0.038. Finally, Laeven (2000) using a
panel of (mostly) listed ￿rms in 13 developing countries for 1988 to 1998 ￿nds a coe¢ cient for debt
that ranges between -0.014 and -0.057 for the full sample and between -0.03 and -0.13 for ￿rms in
countries in which ￿nancial liberalization has not take place. Hence, in most cases, existing studies
have found coe¢ cients similar in magnitude to our estimates. Larger coe¢ cients have been found
only in cases of severely regulated ￿nancial markets or administrative control of credit.
The ￿ndings reported in Table (2) are not what one would expect from a naive approach to
balance sheet e⁄ects ￿an approach in which dollar debt is assumed to be randomly distributed
across ￿rms. On the one hand we obtain negative coe¢ cient estimate for total debt, suggesting
that balance sheet variables do a⁄ect investment as expected. On the other hand, we ￿nd either a
negligible or a positive e⁄ect of holding dollar debt during a depreciation ￿suggesting that balance
sheet e⁄ects do not play a role in determining ￿rm investment. We argue in section IV that these
apparently contradictory ￿ndings are the result of ￿rms ￿matching￿ the currency composition
of liabilities with the elasticity of their income to the exchange rate. Those ￿rms holding more
dollar debt are also those ￿rms whose current and future income increase the most following a
depreciation. Hence, for those ￿rms that choose to hold dollar debt, the negative balance sheet
e⁄ect of a depreciation is o⁄set by the positive e⁄ect of the depreciation on current and future
income.
III.B Robustness
Before exploring this ￿matching￿hypothesis in more detail, we show in this subsection that the
result we obtain in the previous section is robust to the inclusion of a series of additional controls,
to alternative estimators, are not the result of focusing on realized depreciations versus unexpected
depreciations nor of overweighting certain countries or episodes.
10III.B.1 Omitted Variables
Dollar-indebted ￿rms might di⁄er from their peso-indebted counterparts along other dimensions
than the currency composition of debt, so our ￿rst concern is that our results are driven by omitted
variables16. For example, the ￿rms that are able to issue debt in dollars may have better access
to international or domestic capital markets or have a di⁄erent maturity structure of debt, and as
such can better cope with the credit crunches that tend to ￿gure in the emerging-market crises.
To address this, we start with the speci￿cations presented in columns (5) and (10) of Table (2)
and add plausible proxies for the supposed omitted variables. Each panel of Table (3) reports the
coe¢ cient on the (D￿￿￿e) interaction and the estimated coe¢ cients on the additional controls. In
no case does the inclusion of these proxies result in a signi￿cant negative estimate of the relationship
between investment and (D￿ ￿ ￿e).
[Insert Table 3 here]
Access to Credit If ￿rms holding dollar debt have di⁄erential access to international capital,
and changes in the relative supply of domestic and foreign credit occur simultaneously with changes
in the exchange rate, then our results may come from having omitted credit-market conditions in
our estimates of investment. For example, in 1995, during the tequila crisis, Mexico su⁄ered more-
or-less simultaneous depreciation, capital ￿ ight, and collapse of the domestic banking system. In
such an episode, the coe¢ cient on (D￿ ￿ ￿e) could well be capturing the asymmetric e⁄ects of
contractions in domestic credit and international capital in￿ ows.
To control for changing credit conditions, we estimate the investment regressions including an
indicator of domestic credit (the change in the stock of private credit issued by domestic banks)
and a measure of foreign credit in￿ ows. In each case, we interact the macroeconomic variable with
total leverage and the fraction of debt in foreign currency to allow for the di⁄erential e⁄ects of local
and international credit supply on ￿rms.
Note that we do not promote these variables as the de￿nitive measure of shifting access to credit.
Instead, we argue that they serve to determine whether the above estimates are contaminated by
omitted-variable bias. If D￿ is correlated with credit access, then including its interaction with
aggregate credit variables absorbs the relevant part of the omitted variable. If D￿ is not correlated
with the omitted access variable, then there is no omitted variable bias to be concerned with.
Consequently, this test is informative in either case.
Table (3) shows the investment results obtained after including aggregate credit variables. Panel
A reports our basic speci￿cation, while panel (B) allows for the possibility of a di⁄erential e⁄ect
of depreciations between ￿rms of di⁄erent size17. In panel (C), we introduce a measure of capital
in￿ ows, and, in panel D, a measure of domestic credit. We ￿nd that in most cases the coe¢ cients on
the interactions of currency composition of debt and total debt with the aggregate credit variables
are not signi￿cantly di⁄erent from zero. More to the point, the (D￿ ￿ ￿e) interaction remains
either positive or insigni￿cant even after including this additional set of controls.
16By this we are refering to omitted variables besides the exchange rate sensitivity of pro￿ts, which we consider in
section IV.
17We classify ￿rms by size according to total assets. We obtain similar results (not reported) when ￿rms are
classi￿ed according to current assets.
11Currency Mismatch versus Maturity Mismatch The impact of changing credit conditions
will likely depend on the maturity structure of ￿rm debt. Therefore, another credit-related hypoth-
esis is that our results might be driven by having omitted the maturity structure of debt and its
interaction with aggregate credit conditions. For example, if ￿rms are frequently rolling over their
debt, they will su⁄er more from a negative shock to the supply of credit. To control for possible
di⁄erences in the maturity structure of debt between dollar and peso-indebted ￿rms, we directly
include measures of short-term debt in our investment regressions. Furthermore, paralleling the
treatment of dollar debt, we interact short-term debt with a set of macroeconomic variables.
The results of including these interactions are displayed in Panels (E) and (F) of Table (3).
We fail to ￿nd a di⁄erential e⁄ect of depreciations across debt maturity, as reported in Panel (E),
although credit shocks do have a di⁄erential e⁄ect on contemporaneous inventory investment of
￿rms with higher ratios of short term debt (Panel F). For both types of investment, we continue to
obtain estimates of the coe¢ cient on the interaction of dollar debt and the change in the exchange
rate that are not signi￿cantly negative. Overall, the evidence of an omitted-variable bias stemming
from the maturity structure of debt is not compelling.
Lagged Performance In this subsection, we argue that the observed investment response to
(D￿￿￿e) is not due to dollar-indebted ￿rms being ￿high performing￿and, therefore, being able to
better adapt to the changing exchange rate. Speci￿cally, we condition on lagged ￿rm performance
by including lags of earnings and their interaction with the change in the exchange rate. These
results are displayed in Panel (G) of Table (3). Interestingly, the inclusion of these variables results
in negligible changes (one standard error) in our estimate of the e⁄ect of (D￿ ￿ ￿e).
Cross-Border Ownership and Information Disclosure It may be the case, therefore, that
di⁄erences in the ownership of the ￿rm bias our estimate of the (D￿ ￿ ￿e) coe¢ cient. To address
this issue we construct two variables that proxy for foreign ownership18. The ￿rst of these variables
indicates whether the ￿rm has a parent company. The initial coding is drawn directly from the
Bloomberg database using their coding scheme. In all cases, we review the online archives of
company news to verify that these ownership relationships predate the ￿rm￿ s ￿rst appearance in
our sample. This ensures that these indicators are predetermined variables rather than endogenous
outcomes. The second measure of foreign ownership is a dummy variable that indicates whether, in
the previous period, the ￿rm￿ s shares were listed in a foreign stock exchange in the form of American
Depositary Receipts (ADRs). In addition to being a proxy for foreign ownership, a foreign listing
may also have e⁄ects on information disclosure and liquidity of ￿rm equity that may bias our results.
This variable is constructed matching the ￿rms in the Bank of New York database on ADRs with
those in our sample. Finally, we code whether the ￿rm￿ s accountant is one of the American ￿Big
Six￿￿rms, which might improve a corporation￿ s access to international capital markets.
The results of estimating our baseline equation with the ownership controls are reported in
Panel (H) of Table (3). Once again, the e⁄ect of the additional control variables on our estimated
coe¢ cient on the (D￿ ￿ ￿e) interaction is minimal. The positive and signi￿cant coe¢ cients we
18A series of recent papers have emphasized the e⁄ects of ownership and information variables on the relative per-
formance of ￿rms in crisis periods. Mitton (2002) ￿nds that ￿rm level variables related to ownership and information
disclosure had a strong impact on the relative performance (stock returns) of listed ￿rms during the Asian crisis.
Desai, Foley and Forbes (2004) ￿nd that subsidiaries of US multinationals outperform their locally owned couterparts
in periods following large depreciations
12obtain on the ADR dummy for t + 1 ￿xed capital investment and on the ￿Bix Six￿dummy for
current ￿xed and next period inventory investment is in line with the results in Mitton (2002).
Relaxing the Assumption of Linearity A plausible hypothesis is that the response of invest-
ment to leverage is nonlinear, so that a given change in debt causes a larger change in investment
in highly leveraged ￿rms. To evaluate the e⁄ect of nonlinearity on our results, we estimate our
basic investment speci￿cation allowing the (D￿￿￿e) interaction term to vary across indebtedness.
The results of this exercise are reported in Panel (I). Our main results remain una⁄ected by the
additional terms.
Above, we treat depreciations and appreciations as having symmetrical e⁄ects. To evaluate the
validity of the symmetry assumption, we generate a dummy variable that takes on the value of one
if the currency has appreciated, and interact it with the exchange rate and with our (D￿ ￿ ￿e)
interaction coe¢ cient. We are thus allowing both for the main e⁄ect and the interaction to be
di⁄erent in depreciations and appreciations. We report the results of this speci￿cation in Table (3)
panels (I) and (J). Allowing for a depreciation to impact ￿rm level investment di⁄erently from an
appreciation does not a⁄ect our main conclusion; the coe¢ cient on (D￿ ￿￿e) is never signi￿cantly
negative.
Alternative Exchange Rate Measures One could argue that the balance sheet and competi-
tiveness e⁄ects of a devaluation pertain to di⁄erent measures of the real exchange rate. In the case
of the balance sheet e⁄ect, it is the change of the domestic currency vis-a-vis the price level that
will render dollar debt more expensive (expost) than its peso equivalent. For the competitiveness
e⁄ect, standard open economy models suggest that it is the change of foreign prices vis-a-vis the
domestic price level that is important for ￿rm pro￿ts and investment decisions. With this in mind
we augment our basic speci￿cation to include international price-indices19. Adding this additional
variable allows us to disentangle the direct impact of changing international prices from that of
changes in the value of the domestic currency. The results are reported in the last panel of Table
(3). As in previous panels, our main results are not altered by including these additional control
variables.
III.B.2 Alternative Estimators
We estimate the e⁄ect of (D￿ ￿ ￿e) on investment using numerous alternative estimators. These
new results are reported in Table (4) and Figures (1) and (2) and described in this subsection.
Although in some cases the choice of estimator does a⁄ect our point estimates, in no case do we
￿nd a signi￿cant negative e⁄ect of dollar debt on investment following a depreciation.
[Insert Table 4 here]
We begin with alternative computations for the standard errors using the ordinary least-squares
(OLS) estimator. These estimates employ the speci￿cation from Table 2 Columns (5) and (10),
19The international prices are the weighted average of the consumer price indices of each country￿ s 5 main trading
partners during 1995 (the mid-point of our sample).
13which include the interactions between dollar debt and total debt with changes in the exchange
rate, the main e⁄ects of dollar and total debt, the
P
j (1 ￿ ￿)j Di;t￿1￿cpij;t terms and the lagged
dependent variable. Each Panel displays only the estimates on (D￿ ￿ ￿e). (Note that the point
estimates do not change in Panels (A)-(D), only the standard errors.) Panel (A) contains the basic
OLS standard errors, i.e., assuming no heteroskedasticity and no intra-class correlation. Panel (B)
reports Huber-White (￿robust￿ ) standard errors that allow for heteroskedasticity. (These are the
default throughout the present study.) Panel (C) corrects the errors for the presence of correlated
disturbances across ￿rms within each country ￿ year cell. Finally, in computing the standard
errors, the estimator in Panel (D) allows for fairly generic correlational structures within ￿rms. As
we read down the panels, the pattern of signi￿cance is essentially the same.
When we control more ￿ exibly for the predetermined variables, very little changes in our es-
timates. Above, we use linear terms to control for the ￿rst-order e⁄ects of the lagged accounting
variables (dollar debt and total debt). In Panel (E), we allow the e⁄ects of the predetermined
accounting variables (dollar debt and total debt) to be highly ￿ exible by including them as polyno-
mials of order ten. In e⁄ect, we are parametrically matching ￿rms based on their t￿1 characteristics.
The estimates are qualitatively similar using this technique.
Our baseline speci￿cation assumes that the error term is uncorrelated with the lagged dependent
variable. This assumption is violated if there is an error term in the partial adjustment model for the
stock of capital, not in the investment equation as we assume. In this case taking ￿rst di⁄erences
to obtain the investment speci￿cation generates a mechanical correlation between It￿1 and ￿"t
(the ￿rst di⁄erence of the error term). We carry out two exercises in this subsection to address
this concern. First, in Panel (F) we instrument for It￿1 using twice lagged values of investment.
Results remained virtually unchanged, with the exception of column (3), which reports the e⁄ect of
dollar debt on contemporaneous inventory. Unlike previous speci￿cations the estimated coe¢ cient
of (D￿ ￿￿e) on period-t inventory investment is negative, although not signi￿cant at conventional
con￿dence levels.
Next, we estimate our baseline speci￿cation constraining the coe¢ cient of the lagged dependent
variable (￿). We report the estimated coe¢ cients on (D￿ ￿ ￿e) obtained in this way in Figure
(1). Over the stable range of values of ￿ (￿ 2 [￿1;1]) we obtain positive coe¢ cient estimates in
regressions for t and t + 1 ￿xed capital and for t + 1 inventory. For period t inventory investment,
the estimated coe¢ cient on (D￿ ￿ ￿e) is negative for ￿ > 0:25; but these estimates are never
signi￿cantly di⁄erent from zero. We follow a similar approach to address the possible endogeneity
of the main e⁄ect of dollar debt. As reported in Figure 2, the estimated coe¢ cient on the dollar
debt real exchange rate interaction remains positive for a reasonable range of parameter choices for
the main e⁄ects of dollar debt.
Controlling for ￿rm-level ￿xed e⁄ects does not generate estimates that favor the currency-
mismatch hypothesis either. In Panel (H), we add ￿rm-speci￿c e⁄ects to the speci￿cations. We
combine the matching estimator with ￿rm ￿xed e⁄ects in Panel (I). Although smaller coe¢ cient
estimates are obtained for all dependent variables except t+1 inventory investment, none of these
coe¢ cients is negative20.
Finally, the addition of an autocorrelated error term yields substantially similar results. We
allow for an autoregressive error of order one (AR(1)) at the ￿rm level in the estimation of the
20In Appendix B we repeat the sensitivity anaylisis from the previous subsection using the estimators from panels
F, G and H of table 4 presented in this subsection. Our main results remain unchanged.
14￿xed-e⁄ects model. These results are found in Panel (J). None of the estimates of (D￿ ￿ ￿e)
reported in this panel is signi￿cantly di⁄erent from zero.
III.B.3 Unexpected Depreciations
Could our results be driven by the fact that many of the devaluation episodes in our sample were
anticipated by ￿rms and the ￿nancial market? If uncovered interest parity holds, then the expected
component of a depreciation will be factored in to the domestic interest rates in the period running
up to the exchange rate realignment. This being the case, ￿rms will only ￿nd dollar debt to be
more ￿expensive￿expost if the realized depreciation exceeds the expected depreciation.
To see this more clearly, recall the expression for the law of motion of debt derived in section
(II). Abstracting from new debt issued in the current period, and assuming that accrued interest
is not paid o⁄ (DSt = DNt = 0) the current value of previous period dollar debt will be given by
~ D￿











If, in addition, if we assume that all domestic debt is issued in nominal terms, then the current
value of peso denominated debt will be given by21






Combining the previous two expressions, the exogenous component of total debt in period t
inherited from period t ￿ 1 is approximately
~ Pt t ~ Dt￿1(1 + rt￿1 ￿ ￿cpit) + ~ D￿
t￿1(1 + r￿
t￿1 + ￿st ￿ ￿cpit)
where (rt￿1 ￿ ￿cpit) is the real ex-post interest rate on domestic currency debt and (r￿
t￿1 + ￿et ￿
￿cpit) is the real ex-post rate on dollar denominated loans, and all lower case variables correspond
to logs. Finally, if uncovered interest parity holds, so that
rt￿1 = Et￿1f￿stg + r￿
t￿1;
the law-of-motion becomes:
~ Pt t ~ Dt￿1(1 + Et￿1f￿stg + r￿
t￿1 ￿ ￿cpit) + ~ D￿
t￿1(1 + ￿st + r￿
t￿1 ￿ ￿cpit): (8)
>From equation (8) is is clear that a unit of dollar debt will be more expensive than a unit of peso
debt ex-post only if the realized nominal depreciation exceeds the unexpected nominal depreciation,
i.e. if Et￿1f￿stg < ￿st.
We carry out two exercises in this subsection to address this concern. First, we repeat our
estimations of investment for a speci￿c devaluation episode that we believe had a large unexpected
21Assuming that all debt is issued in pesos is equivalent to assuming that arbitrage exists between the local nominal
and indexed debt markets.
15component: the tequila crisis in Mexico during 1994 and 1995. Second, we use peso and dollar in-
terest rates to construct a measure of unexpected depreciation and estimate its e⁄ect on investment
of dollar indebted ￿rms.
The estimation results for the tequila crisis are reported in Table (5). Columns (1) through
(3) and (7) through (9) of Table (5) include Mexican ￿rms for all years in our sample (1990 to
1999). Columns (4) and (10) use a sample restricted to 1994 and 1995. In line with our full
sample results, the estimated coe¢ cient on the (D￿ ￿ ￿e) interaction term is not negative in
either sub-sample. Indeed for current capital expenditures and t + 1 inventory investment the
estimated coe¢ cient is positive and signi￿cant. On the other hand, the estimated coe¢ cient on
the interaction between total debt and depreciation is negative for current and next period capital
expenditures, and signi￿cantly so for current capital expenditures. Firms in Mexico holding higher
total debt in times of depreciations invested relatively less. Furthermore, note that for ￿xed capital
investment conditioning on total debt ￿ ￿e makes a large di⁄erence for the estimated coe¢ cient
of the (D￿ ￿ ￿e) interaction.
[Insert Table 5 here]
The remaining columns report an alternative exercise that focuses on ￿rm investment in either
1994 or 1995. Controlling for previous period total debt, we ￿nd that capital expenditures were
not signi￿cantly lower for those ￿rms holding more dollar debt in the previous period either in
1994 (column 5, panel A) or 1995 (column 6, panel A). Those ￿rms holding more total debt in the
previous period, however, did invest signi￿cantly less in both years. In turn, the results reported
in columns (5) and (6) of panel B show that ￿rms holding more dollar debt in 1993 did not invest
less in 1995 and ￿rms holding more dollar debt in 1994 did not invest less in 1996. As in panel A,
what matters for future capital investment is not dollar debt but total debt. Results for inventory
investment are mixed. However, in none of the speci￿cations do we ￿nd a signi￿cant negative e⁄ect
of dollar debt on investment in periods of depreciation. Overall, the results presented in Table (5)
suggest that our results are not driven by a series of expected depreciation episodes.
A straight-forward transformation of equation (8) allows us to evaluate the e⁄ects on investment
of unexpected depreciations directly. Rearranging equation (8), and bearing in mind that total
debt ~ Pt￿1 is de￿ned as ~ Pt￿1 = ~ Dt￿1+ ~ D￿
t￿1 and that the ex-post peso rate ~ rt￿1 is de￿ned as
~ rt￿1 = rt￿1 ￿ ￿cpit; we get the following expression for total debt
~ PT




t is the unexpected nominal depreciation: ￿su
t = ￿st ￿Et￿1f￿stg: The intuition behind
this expression is straightforward, controlling for the ex-post real interest rate on peso loans, dollar
debt will lead to higher total liabilities if realized depreciation exceeds the expected depreciation.
The basic empirical speci￿cation that results is






+ ￿ ~ D￿
it￿1 + ￿jt + "ijt (9)
where once again Iijt is ￿rm level investment, ￿su
t is calculated as the di⁄erence between the
expected depreciation rate implicit in dollar and peso rates and realized depreciation and ￿jt are
country ￿ year ￿xed e⁄ects. To equation (9) we also add additional variables, the most important of
16which is the interaction between dollar debt and the realized change in the exchange rate (D￿ ￿ ￿e)
Including this additional variable allows us to disentangle the e⁄ects of expected and unexpected
changes in e22.
Table (6) presents the results of estimating variants of equation (9) for ￿xed capital and inven-
tory investment. As in previous speci￿cations panel A reports the e⁄ects on current investment
while panel B repeats these estimates for the following year investment. The regression summarized
in columns (1) and (5) follows directly from equation (9) while columns (2) and (6) includes the
(D￿ ￿ ￿e) interaction, and, of course, the corresponding main e⁄ects. In turn columns (3) and (7)
includes an interaction between total leverage and the real exchange rate. Finally columns (4) and
(8) include the lagged dependent variable.
[Insert Table 6 here]
What are the main results that emerge from table (6)? First, in all speci￿cations the estimated
coe¢ cient on (D￿ ￿ ￿e) is positive, and in some speci￿cations signi￿cant at conventional con￿dence
levels. Second, the estimated coe¢ cient on
￿
~ D￿ ￿ ￿su
￿
is almost always not signi￿cant, and never
negative and signi￿cant.
All in all, both sets of results presented in this section suggest that even when depreciations are
unexpected, the competitiveness e⁄ect cancels out the balance sheet e⁄ect in our sample.
III.C Decompositions By Country
Results by country are found in Table (7). These estimates employ the speci￿cation from Table 2,
Columns (5) and (10), although each cell only reports estimates of the e⁄ect of (D￿ ￿ ￿e) for the
denoted country.
[Insert Table 7 here]
In no instance do we ￿nd a signi￿cantly negative relationship between investment and (D￿￿￿e).
In the Argentine, Chilean and Colombian samples results are insigni￿cantly di⁄erent from zero,
though generally positive. For Brazil, the coe¢ cients on (D￿ ￿ ￿e) are signi￿cant and positive
for contemporaneous investment, and positive but not signi￿cant for next period investment. For
Mexico, the coe¢ cient estimates are uniformly positive, and signi￿cantly di⁄erent from zero for
two of the four measures of investment.
22A brief comment on the data is merited here before we move on to discussing the empirical results. For Argentina,
Brazil and Mexico r
￿
j;t￿1 is the total return on the portfolio of dollar-denominated bonds included in each country￿ s
EMBI index. For Colombia and Chile this index is not available for most of the sample so we use alternative measures.
In the case of Chile we use the interest rate on 30-89 day dollar-denominated loans, published by the Central Bank of
Chile. For Colombia, as dollar contracts are prohibited in the domestic ￿nancial system, and no series of returns on
dollar denominated bonds placed in international capital markets where available, we use the average cross country
EMBI index. In turn, rt￿1 is the deposit rate in domestic currency. We use the deposit rate because series of lending
rates where not available over the full sample period for most countries, however changes in deposit rates closely
mirror changes in lending rates. A regresion of changes in the deposit rate against changes in the lending rate over
the subset of our sample where both data where available has a R
2 of 0.85. The exact rates used are detailed in the
appendix.
17IV The Competitiveness E⁄ect
In this section, we argue that our failure to ￿nd a negative e⁄ect of dollar debt on investment
following a depreciation is due to di⁄erences across ￿rms in the response of their current and future
pro￿ts (the competitiveness e⁄ect). The larger balance sheet e⁄ects of a depreciation on ￿rms
holding dollar debt are o⁄set by the larger competitiveness gains for these ￿rms. This suggests
that ￿rms match the currency composition of their income with that of their liabilities, and by
doing so hedge their exchange rate risk. We provide three pieces of evidence for this claim:
1. When contemporaneous sales and costs are taken into account, we ￿nd that the estimated
coe¢ cient on (D￿ ￿ ￿e) is smaller than what was estimated above.
2. Firms that could be expected to bene￿t from a depreciation￿ ￿rms that have tradable prod-
ucts, for example￿ are more likely to hold debt that is denominated in foreign currency.
3. Dollar-indebted ￿rms experience a relative surge in pro￿ts following a depreciation (both in
the year of and in the year after).
All three facts indicate positive currency matching of debt and income ￿ ows.
IV.A Controls for Competitiveness
Exchange rate movements change relative prices, often rather markedly. If ￿rms are matching the
currency composition of their debt and income, the surge in their liabilities may be accompanied
by an increase in their pro￿t opportunities and current earnings. We argue that this e⁄ect is a
plausible explanation for our failure to ￿nd a negative e⁄ect of a devaluation on investment in ￿rms
holding dollar debt.
When contemporaneous earnings are taken into account, we ￿nd that the estimated coe¢ cient
on (D￿ ￿ ￿e) is smaller than what was estimated above. This can be seen in panel (B) of
Table (8), in which we augment the baseline regressions with contemporaneous measures of sales and
production costs. Note, however that the idiosyncratic measures of sales and costs are endogenous,
so we cannot be assured of consistent estimates of the e⁄ect of income on investment. In panel (C)
we address this issue by instrumenting for sales and costs with interactions between 2 digit ISIC
sector dummies and lagged export-to-asset ratios with changes in the real exchange rate. Once
again we ￿nd that when contemporaneous pro￿t measures are taken into account the estimated
coe¢ cient on (D￿ ￿ ￿e) is smaller than our baseline estimate (reported in panel (A)).
IV.B Determinants of the Currency Composition of Debt
In this subsection we examine the ￿rm level determinants of liability dollarization. To do so, we
estimate the following equation on the full sample
￿ijt = vj + ￿￿ijt + Xijt￿ + uijt (10)
in which ￿ijt is the ratio of dollar debt to total liabilities; vj are country-speci￿c intercepts; Xijt￿ are
controls, including the natural logarithm of ￿rm assets and a dummy variable indicating whether
18the ￿rm is a subsidiary of a larger company; and ￿ijt corresponds to one of several proxies for the
sensitivity of pro￿ts to the real exchange rate:
1. a dummy variable that takes on a value of one if the ￿rm is in a tradable sector (agriculture,
mining, or manufacturing);
2. the average elasticity of each sector￿ s output to the real exchange rate;23
3. a dummy variable if the ￿rm has foreign subsidiaries.
In each speci￿cation, proxies of exchange-rate sensitivity show a positive correlation with the
fraction of debt issued in foreign currency. Columns (1) through (3) of table (9) show the main
results for the full sample estimation. In all speci￿cations, the estimates of ￿ are positive and
signi￿cant: ￿rms whose income we expect to be positively correlated with the exchange rate have
a higher fraction of foreign-currency-denominated liabilities. The fraction of dollar-denominated
liabilities is 5% higher in ￿rms that belong to the tradable sectors (the average value of ￿ijt is 24%).
The sectorial elasticity of value added to the real exchange rate is also a signi￿cant predictor of the
currency denomination of debt, and these two variables enter signi￿cantly when included jointly.
Additionally, ￿rm size is positive and signi￿cant in all speci￿cations; larger ￿rms hold a higher
fraction of dollar debt. Although we do not report them individually, country dummies are also
highly signi￿cant (at the 99% level of con￿dence) with ￿rms in Argentina and Mexico holding the
highest fractions of dollar debt in our sample. All in all, size and tradability (or sectorial elasticity
of output to the real exchange rate) explain close to 45% of variance in ￿ijt:24
[Insert Table 9 here]
Firms with international operations were also much more likely to issue their debt in dollars.
The last column of Table (9) shows the results of estimating equation (10) for the remaining proxy
of ￿ijt on a sub-sample of ￿rms.25 As in the previous speci￿cations, both the size variable and
the tradable dummy are always positive and signi￿cant at the 99% con￿dence level. Column (5)
includes the dummy variable for ￿rms that have a parent company and the dummy variable for
￿rms that own subsidiaries in foreign countries. Both of these variables are signi￿cant. The positive
coe¢ cient on the subsidiary variable is in line with the results discussed above. Income from the
foreign subsidiary, in terms of domestic currency, is positively correlated with movements in the
real exchange rate.
Our results in this section suggest that matching does take place among ￿rms included in our
sample. Firms with higher dollar debt are those ￿rms whose earnings we expect to increase in the
event of a depreciation.
23To construct this measure, we estimate ￿(lnyjkt) = ￿0 +￿1￿ln(ejt)+￿3xjt +"jkt for the period for each sector
k in each country j. ￿(lnyjkt) is the ￿rst di⁄erence of the log of sector k value added, ￿ln(ejt) the ￿rst di⁄erence of
the log of the real exchange rate and xjt a vector of country-level controls that includes capital in￿ ows and growth
in private-sector bank credit.
24We obtain similar results when we estimate ￿ using a tobit regression to take account for censoring of the LHS
variable.
25Because of data availability, the sample used in speci￿cation E is smaller and excludes ￿rms from Argentina and
some of the ￿rms from Brazil. To isolate the e⁄ects of changing the sample versus adding controls, we add column
D which presents the results of our baseline estimation using an identical sample to E.
19IV.C Relative Change in Pro￿tability
In this subsection, we show that, after a depreciation, dollar-indebted ￿rms see their sales and
earnings rise substantially relative to their peso-indebted counterparts. These ￿ndings provide
additional support for our proposition that ￿rms holding more dollar debt are better poised to take
pro￿table advantage of the depreciation and that this factor explains their increased investment.
To analyze sales and earnings, we employ the same empirical framework used above for invest-
ment. Table (10) presents estimates of the di⁄erential e⁄ect of exchange rate movements across
￿rms with varying degrees of dollar indebtedness. The speci￿cation of these regressions parallel
those of Table (2), column (4). We include our principal interaction e⁄ect (D￿ ￿ ￿e), all main
e⁄ects, and dummies for each country/year cell. Columns (1) and (2) of Table (10) show that in
periods in which the local currency depreciated, sales were higher in ￿rms holding dollar than they
were in ￿rms holding peso debt.
[Insert Table 10 here]
Dollar-indebted ￿rms also saw signi￿cantly higher earnings in the year following a depreciation.
These results are displayed in Table (10), columns (3) through (6). For example, column (3) of
Panel A indicates that a ￿rm holding one additional dollar of foreign-currency debt received 36
cents in extra earnings in a year following a one-unit logarithmic change in the real exchange rate.
Of course, as we document above, such a ￿rm was likely to be investing more as well. Therefore,
we see in columns (4) and (5) that a fraction of these higher pro￿ts is due to the di⁄erential
investment behavior of the ￿rms. Nevertheless, even after controlling for investment behavior, the
rise in earnings in the subsequent year is still positive and signi￿cant.
Finally, as further support of the varying degree of competitiveness e⁄ects across levels of
dollar debt, we demonstrate that this relative increase in future pro￿tability occurs even after
controlling for contemporaneous earnings. The positive investment responses observed above were
also robust to the inclusion of contemporaneous pro￿tability. Therefore, some aspect of the change
in competitiveness must have been uncorrelated with period-t earnings. In column (6) of Table
(10), we add contemporaneous earnings to the regression. The predictive power of our interaction
term remains positive and statistically signi￿cant.
These results serve as further evidence that ￿rms that choose to hold higher dollar debt experi-
ence relative increases in current pro￿ts (and therefore internal funds for investment) and in their
marginal product of capital (MPK) following a depreciation. This bolsters our hypothesis that
we fail to ￿nd a negative coe¢ cient on (D￿ ￿ ￿e) because of a large di⁄erential competitiveness
component.
V The Balance Sheet E⁄ect
In this section, we evaluate the key ingredient required for a depreciation to be contractionary in
the models discussed in section II: namely, the negative e⁄ect of a depreciation on the accounting
net-worth of ￿rms holding dollar debt. In particular, we address the following questions:
201. Did overall debt actually increase in those ￿rms holding dollar debt during a depreciation?
(Yes.)
2. Was this rise in debt fully o⁄set by higher current earnings so that the balance sheets of ￿rms
holding dollar debt did not deteriorate? (Not likely.)
Holding dollar debt during a depreciation leads to an increased indebtedness of the ￿rm (in
domestic currency) 26. This discards two possible explanations for the apparent absence of a net-
worth e⁄ect on investment: that there was a limited e⁄ect on the balance sheet itself or that
the data on dollar debt reported in Bloomberg and Economatica are so error ridden so as to not
adequately measure subsequent balance sheet problems.
We estimate an equation for the predicted total debt and debt service of ￿rm i in country j in
year t. The interaction of (D￿￿￿e) continues to be the term of interest. The theoretical prediction
is that the real value of the ￿rm￿ s debt rises if it holds foreign-currency debt and the exchange rate
goes up faster than the domestic-price level. To equation (7) above, we add DNT
i;t, ￿rm i￿ s net
issuance of new debt in period t. This simple framework provides a basis for predicting autonomous
changes￿ i.e., those caused by the mechanical increase of dollar debt in local currency￿ in the
￿nancial obligations of a ￿rm. We present estimates of this augmented speci￿cation in Table (11).
[Insert Table 11 here]
Firms holding foreign-currency denominated debt saw the value of their debt rise in the after-
math of a depreciation. As before, we focus on the estimated e⁄ect of the interaction of lagged
dollar debt and the change in the real exchange rate. Columns (1) and (2) contain results for the
regressions of total t-period debt on (D￿ ￿ ￿e). In column (3) and (4), we present results for the
e⁄ect on the change in debt. In all cases, holding dollar debt during a depreciation causes a near
one-for-one rise in the real peso value of debt.
Comparing the ￿rst four columns of Table (11) suggests that excluding new debt from the
analysis has no appreciable change on our estimates of the e⁄ect of the dollar debt/exchange
rate interaction term. This is fortunate because data on issues of new debt are not available for
many ￿rms, especially for those from countries already poorly represented in the sample. To take
maximal advantage of the cross-country nature of our data set, we exclude new-debt issues from
the remainder of the analysis.
Holding foreign-currency debt during an exchange rate depreciation also increases the interest
charges incurred by the ￿rm. This result is displayed in column (5) of Table (11), in which the
dependent variable is accrued interest charges. The (D￿ ￿ ￿e) term is associated with a increase
in interest charges, although this e⁄ect is not precisely determined. Reassuringly, the three debt
variables displayed all have coe¢ cients that are of the order of interest rates, and debt in local
currency is associated with substantially higher interest payments on average.
26As seen above, the dollar-indebted ￿rms tended to be larger and produce relatively tradable output. It seems
possible, therefore, that they might have been savvy about anticipating exchange rate movements and perhaps
experienced with the use of ￿nancial derivatives. Such instruments could have been used to ￿hedge￿away balance-
sheet risk. Nevertheless, we show that exchange rate realignments did indeed have the supposed e⁄ect on ￿rms￿
balance sheets: Firms holding dollar debt saw the real (peso) value of their debt rise substantially. If ￿rms do in fact
buy derivatives or substitute debt to o⁄set the mechanical revaluation of their debt, they appear to do so to a limited
degree.
21Finally, in column (6), we sum the values for the change in debt and the accrued interest
charges to produce a single statistic that describes how the ￿rm￿ s overall ￿nancial obligations
have changed because of the interaction of dollar debt and the change in the exchange rate. Not
surprisingly, the coe¢ cient on the interaction is approximately equal to the sum on the individually
estimated e⁄ects. Thus, for every extra dollar of debt held during a depreciation, ￿rms experience
a proportional increase in their ￿nancial obligations of about $1.28 per unit of log change in the
real exchange rate.
The next stage, which incorporates the e⁄ect of a change in the exchange rate on current
earnings, is relatively uncomplicated. Using the estimated coe¢ cients from previous sections, we
sum up the e⁄ects of a depreciation on debt and on earnings to ￿nd the impact of a depreciation
on the ￿rm￿ s balance sheet. The components of this sum are displayed in Table (12). We ￿nd that
holding dollar debt during a depreciation causes a decline in ￿rm net worth which is not fully o⁄set
by higher current pro￿ts. This result is consistent with the larger relative drops in stock market
capitalization in dollar indebted Asian ￿rms, found by Allayannis et al (2001).
[Insert Table 12 here]
VI Discussion
VI.A Dollar Debt and Currency Mismatches
The main empirical question addressed in this paper is whether ￿rms holding more dollar liabilities
invest relatively less than their peso-indebted counterparts in periods following a depreciation. For
our sample of Latin American ￿rms, the answer is no. Using a broad set of speci￿cations, estimation
methods and measures of investment we fail to ￿nd a negative and signi￿cant e⁄ect of (D￿ ￿ ￿e)
on investment: ￿rms holding dollar debt do not invest relatively less than their peso counterparts
following a depreciation.
There are two possible explanations for this result. The ￿rst, is that changes in the local
currency value of dollar debt have no e⁄ect on the investment decisions of ￿rms in our sample.
This would suggest either that leverage has no impact on investment, or that market participants
believe that temporary changes in leverage due to depreciations have little bearing on the ￿rms
ability to repay its debt in future periods. The second explanation is that ￿rms match the currency
composition of their income with that of their debt, and by doing so hedge exchange rate risk. As
a result of this matching, ￿rms with high levels of dollar debt are also ￿rms whose current earnings
(and marginal product of capital) go up following a depreciation. These positive competitiveness
e⁄ects o⁄set the negative balance sheet e⁄ects of dollar debt.
The results in this paper support the second explanation. For a start we ￿nd evidence of
currency matching. Firms whose income we expect a-priori to be correlated with the real exchange
rate hold more dollar debt, and ￿rms holding more dollar debt see larger relative increase in their
current and future pro￿ts following a depreciation. In turn, the negative coe¢ cient on total debt
in most investment speci￿cations and the fact that ￿rms choose to match in the ￿rst place suggest
that balance sheet e⁄ects do impact ￿rm output and investment decisions. Note, however, that our
estimates suggest that these balance sheet e⁄ects are small. The estimated coe¢ cient on the e⁄ect
of total debt on t-period ￿xed capital investment (￿0:03) and the estimated e⁄ect of dollar debt on
22total debt (approximately 1) imply that for a ￿rm with a dollar debt to asset ratio of 50% a 50%
real depreciation would result in a drop in investment of 0:75%; less than one-tenth of the sample
average investment rate.
A series of recent empirical studies have also addressed the question of whether ￿rms hold-
ing more dollar liabilities invest relatively less following a depreciation using a similar empirical
speci￿cations to the one used in this paper. Bonomo, Martins and Pinto (2003) look at a sample
of publicly listed ￿rms in Brazil over the period 1990-2002 and Benavente, Johnson and Morande
(2003) study the investment response of a similar sample of ￿rms in Chile over the 1994-2001 period.
Neither of these obtain a robust, negative and signi￿cant coe¢ cient on the interaction between dol-
lar debt and the exchange rate. Echeverry, Fergusson, Steiner and Agular (2003) address the same
question using a much larger sample of ￿rms from Colombia. Drawing on data for close to 8000
listed and non-listed ￿rms over the period 1994-2001 they also fail to ￿nd a negative and signi￿cant
negative coe¢ cient on the (D￿ ￿ ￿e) interaction27. Pratap, Lobato and Somuano (2003), on the
other hand, do ￿nd a negative and signi￿cant coe¢ cient on the interaction between dollar debt and
devaluations in publicly listed Mexican ￿rms. We believe, however, that this result is likely driven
by an omitted variable bias. In no speci￿cation do they control for the interaction between total
debt and the real exchange rate. As reported in columns (1) and (2) of Table (5), omitting this
variable results in a sizeable downward bias on the estimated coe¢ cient of the (D￿ ￿ ￿e) interac-
tion. Finally, Luengnaruemitchai (2004) looks at the response of investment to a depreciation in
non-￿nancial ￿rms in Asia, a regional where the balance sheet e⁄ect is believed to be prominent.
He obtains results that are very similar to the ones reported in this paper: ￿rms holding dollar
debt invest at least as much as their counterparts following a depreciation.
A related, but distinct, empirical question is whether ￿rms with larger mismatches between the
currency composition of their liabilities and their income invest relatively less in periods following a
depreciation28. This is equivalent to asking whether ￿all else constant ￿raising levels of dollar debt
will make depreciations less expansionary. To answer this question requires detailed information
on the income and cost structure of ￿rms, as well as the currency denomination of their assets.
With this detailed information it is possible to separate the negative balance sheet e⁄ects of a de-
preciation from its positive competitiveness e⁄ects on current earnings and the demand for capital.
Because of the data requirements there are few empirical papers that address this question, two of
them for Mexico and one for Chile. Aguiar (2002) and Pratap et al (2003) look at the investment
behavior of publicly listed Mexican ￿rms. Aguiar (2002) concentrates on the years around the
tequila crisis, while Pratap et al (2003) analyses ￿rm data from 1989 to 1999. Both control for dif-
ferential competitiveness e⁄ects by including ￿rm level data on exports interacted with the relevant
macroeconomic variables. Both ￿nd that following a depreciation, ￿rms with larger currency mis-
matches invest relatively less. Cowan, Hansen and Herrera (2005) go one step further and include,
in addition to ￿rm level exports, controls for the currency composition of assets and net derivative
positions of Chilean corporations between 1994 and 2001. Interestingly, they con￿rm the results
presented in this paper. Without adding additional competitiveness controls, ￿rms holding dollar
debt do not invest relatively less than peso indebted ￿rms following a depreciation. On the other
hand, once the currency composition of assets and incomes is accounted for, they ￿nd a signi￿cant
27There is also a recent study for Peruvian ￿rms, by Carranza et al (2003). Problems with the empirical speci￿cation
￿in particular the omission of the main e⁄ects of the key interaction terms￿makes the results of this study very
di¢ cult to interpret. In those speci￿cations in which the main e⁄ects are included, they fail to ￿nd a negative and
signi￿cant coe¢ cient on the (D
￿ ￿ ￿e) interaction.
28Note that mismatches and dollar debt will be the same only if there is no matching ￿ i.e. if ￿rm debt is
uncorrelated with the sensitivity of income to the exchange rate.
23negative balance sheet e⁄ect of dollar denominated debt.
Finally, our ￿matching￿is consistent with existing studies of currency exposure and derivative
use by ￿rms in emerging markets. Allayannis et al (2001) study the currency hedging practices of
non-￿nancial ￿rms from eight East Asian countries over the period 1996-1998 and document that
in ￿rms in East Asia foreign cash incomes are a substitute for derivative hedging for dollar indebted
￿rms. Cowan at al (2005) obtain similar results for a sample of Chilean non-￿nancial ￿rms.
VI.B Corporate versus Aggregate Investment
While the focus of the present study is the corporate sector, it is worth comparing the investment
response of this sector to the full economy￿ s in periods following large depreciations. On the one
hand, large publicly listed ￿rms are less likely to be credit constrained, so that balance sheet e⁄ects
will have smaller bearing on their investment decisions. On the other hand (as shown in Table 9
for our sample) larger corporations take on higher shares of dollar debt, and are therefore more
exposed to balance sheet e⁄ects following a depreciation.
With this in mind, in this section we explore whether our sample is not representative, so that
the large collapse in investment alleged to occur following devaluations occurs only elsewhere in
the economy, speci￿cally in small unlisted ￿rms. We ￿nd that this is not the case. Indeed, in most
cases following large depreciations, the collapse in investment in our sample was actually larger
than the fall in economy-wide private investment.
To construct comparable measures of investment for both our sample and the broader economy
we focus on purchases of equipment and structures, which correspond to ￿xed-capital purchases
from the cash-￿ ow statement in our sample and to gross ￿xed-private-capital formation in the
national accounts. Because the strategy we have employed so far of normalizing by lagged assets
is not feasible for the aggregate data, we consider yearly logarithmic changes in the CPI-de￿ ated
levels of investment.
Table (13) shows the behavior of aggregate purchases of equipment and structures economy-
wide and in our sample around the largest depreciation episode of each country. In all cases but
one, the fall in economy-wide investment is larger than the fall in the aggregate capital expenditures
of our sample. For Colombia, the high rate of growth in sample investment is likely to be due to
the idiosyncratic e⁄ects that dominate the small number of ￿rms in our sample (19 ￿rms in 1999).
[Insert Table here]
VII Conclusions
The present study provides evidence on the e⁄ect of foreign-currency liabilities on ￿rm-level invest-
ment in periods of exchange rate volatility. Our starting point is a concern￿ advanced recently by
several authors￿ about problems stemming from the currency composition of debt among emerging-
market corporations. A consequence of this dollarized debt is that a depreciation may lead to a
deterioration of ￿rm balance sheets (as a result of in￿ ated domestic-currency values of debt) that
could attenuate or even reverse the usual expansionary e⁄ects of the depreciation.
24In this vein, we construct a new database of ￿rm-level accounting information (including the
currency composition of liabilities) for over 450 ￿rms in ￿ve Latin American countries, and use it
to estimate the reduced-form e⁄ect on investment of holding foreign-currency-denominated debt
during an exchange rate realignment. In doing so, we believe that this study addresses a spe-
ci￿c channel through which dollarized liabilities interact with exchange rate movements to a⁄ect
investment by publicly traded ￿rms.
We consistently ￿nd that ￿rms holding dollar debt do not invest less than ￿rms holding peso
debt in the period following a depreciation. This ￿nding is not what one would expect from a naive
model that only considers the detrimental e⁄ect of the exchange rate on liabilities. This result is
robust to the inclusion of a series of controls and alternative estimation methods.
We argue that this result is due to the degree to which ￿rms match the currency composition
of their debt with the elasticity of their income to the exchange rate. In the wake of a depreciation,
the in￿ ated peso value of dollar debt causes a deterioration in ￿rm balance sheets that in turns
induces a reduction in output and investment. However, in our sample, for ￿rms holding higher
levels of dollar debt this negative balance sheet e⁄ect is more than o⁄set by higher current and
future earnings caused by the competitiveness e⁄ect of the depreciation. Providing support for
this hypothesis we ￿nd that, after a depreciation, earnings are higher in those ￿rms holding more
dollar debt. In addition, in our sample, dollarization of liabilities is higher in ￿rms whose income
we expect ex ante to be more positively correlated with the real exchange rate (￿rms with tradable
products, for example).
What do our results imply for the literature on currency mismatches and contractionary de-
preciations? First, we show that ￿rms holding dollar debt do see their balance sheets deteriorate
during depreciations, and, moreover, that total liabilities do appear to in￿ uence investment deci-
sions. Second, in our sample ￿rms ￿match￿the currency composition of income and liabilities, so
that those ￿rms holding more dollarized debt are also those ￿rms whose income is most highly cor-
related with the real exchange rate. Third, as a result of matching, the ratio of dollarized debt is a
poor measure of ￿rm level currency mismatches. A more comprehensive measure must incorporate
measures of the elasticity of ￿rm pro￿ts to the real exchange rate. Sector controls and ￿rm-level
indicators of exposure, albeit imperfect, are a ￿rst step in this direction. Direct measurement of
the idiosyncratic response of income to the exchange rate should also ￿gure prominently in such
analysis as suggested by recent empirical literature. This also suggests that care must be take
when evaluating aggregate (economy-wide) currency mismatches, as dollar debt may provide a
poor measure of exposure to exchange rate ￿ uctuations. Fourth, understanding the microeconomic
and macroeconomic variables that drive ￿rms in particular, and private agents in general, to choose
the currency composition of their debt is a key theoretical and empirical question. If ￿rm level
incentives where distorted in such a way that no ￿matching￿takes place, then depreciations would
indeed be more contractionary for dollar-indebted ￿rms￿as dollar debt translates into ￿rm level
mismatches that lead to reductions in investment and output.
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The following is a description of the main ￿rm-level variables used in the paper.
1. D*, Foreign debt: debt denominated in a foreign currency converted into local currency.
In all countries, accounting standards dictate that conversion of debt from foreign to local
currency values be carried out using the exchange rate for the period in which the balance
sheet is reported￿ in this case December. (Balance Sheet)
2. Investment in ￿xed capital: We combine purchases of ￿xed assets with disposal of ￿xed
assets to construct our measure of ￿xed capital investment. Both of these variables are
detailed in the cash ￿ ow statement. We opt not to use the change in net ￿xed assets as a
measure of investment because accounting norms in most of the countries in our sample allow
for revaluations of assets (Cash Statement)
3. We de￿ne Investment in inventories as the change in inventories in a given period. In-
ventories include raw materials, work in progress, and ￿nished goods. (Balance Sheet)
4. Net sales: revenues from main operating activities. (Income Statement)
5. Costs: cost of sales. (Income Statement)
6. Interest expense: accrued interest on liabilities. (Income Statement)
7. Earnings: earnings before accrued interest, taxes, depreciation, and amortization (EBITDA).
EBITDA = Operating Income + Depreciation and Amortization. (Cash Flow Statement)
8. New debt: measure of new debt issued, net of repayments on outstanding principal. This
variable does not include changes in debt coming from accrued interest payments. (Cash
Flow Statement)
9. Sector is the industry in which the ￿rm has its main operations. We code ￿rms according
to the two-digit ISIC 2 classi￿cation. (Company Notes)
10. Parent is a dummy variable that indicates whether the ￿rm￿ s controlling interest is another
￿rm. See text for coding. (Company Notes and Historical News)
11. International Operations is a dummy variable that indicates whether the ￿rm has sub-
sidiaries or direct operations in other countries. See text for coding. (Company Notes)
12. ADR is a dummy variable that takes on a value of one if the ￿rm￿ s shares were listed in a
foreign stock exchange in the form of American Depositary Reciepts (ADRs) in the previous
period. (Bank of New York (2002))
30Macroeconomic Variables
This subsection contains a description of the macroeconomic variables used throughout the paper.
The source of most data is the IMF International Financial Statistics. IFS codes are in (bold),
series names are in italics. The rest of the data are from the IADB￿ s web site, www.iadb.org.
IFS Data
1. Bank Credit (as a percentage of nominal GDP). A measure of ￿nancial sector credit to the
private sector, speci￿cally claims on the private sector held by deposit banks, end of period.
While a more comprehensive measure of private credit that includes other ￿nancial institutions
exists in the IFS, fewer observations are available. In any case correlation between both series
over the 1980-99 period is extremely high (>.99). Dollar values were converted to domestic
currency using period average exchange rates as described below.
2. In￿ ow of Credit (as a percentage of nominal GDP). A measure of in￿ ows of credit to private
companies. It is the sum of two components of the capital account: debt securities liabilities
(78bnd) and other investment liabilities to other sectors (78bvd). Dollar values were
converted to domestic currency using period average exchange rates as described below.
3. Capital In￿ ows (as a percentage of nominal GDP). An aggregate measure of total net
capital in￿ ows, Financial Account (78bjd).
4. Peso interest rate (annual percentage). nominal interest rates on deposits in the ￿nancial
sector. Deposit rates (60l) where used instead of lending rates as the latter was only available
for a limited sample.
(a) Argentina - deposit rate : rate on 30 to 59 day deposits in national currency.
(b) Brazil - deposit rate : average rate o⁄ered by banks on certi￿cates of deposits of 30 days
or longer.
(c) Chile - deposit rate : 30-89-day loans by ￿nancial institutions.
(d) Colombia - deposit rate: weighted average rate paid on 90 day certi￿cates of deposit.
(e) Mexico - deposit rate: Weighted average payable to individuals on 60 day time deposits.
5. Exchange rate (et): Nominal exchange rate / CPI, end of period and period average.
Other sources
1. Aggregate Output. Real value added by sector and total nominal and real GDP. Sectors
are de￿ned according to the ISIC Revision 2. For Brazil, data for 1997 to 1998 are from the
Brazilian Central Bank. Source: IADB and Brazilian Central Bank.
2. Dollar interest rate.
31(a) For Argentina, Brazil and Mexico the dollar interest rate (r￿
j;t) is the total return on the
portfolio of dollar-denominated bonds included in each country￿ s EMBI index. Source:
JP Morgan.
(b) Chile: annualized interest rate on 30-89 day dollar-denominated loans. Source: Central
Bank of Chile.
(c) Colombia: as dollar contracts are prohibited in the domestic ￿nancial system, and no
series of returns on dollar denominated bonds placed in international capital markets
where available, we use the average cross country EMBI index. Source: JP Morgan
3. The multilateral real exchange rate used in section IV.A was built using the consumer
price indices of each country￿ s 5 main trading partners during 1995 (the mid-point of our sam-
ple), weigthed by trade. Trade weights are from the DOTS database (IMF) and correspond
to the share of imports and exports of each partner in total exports and imports. Nominal
exchange rate and cpi data are from the IFS.
32Country 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 Total
Argentina 3 12 21 25 27 29 51 47 215
Brazil 54 87 101 116 153 237 243 242 256 1,489
Chile 11 18 56 73 86 95 69 2 410
Colombia 1 6 11 17 19 19 73
Mexico 26 35 43 66 73 85 96 105 108 637
Total 80 136 174 260 330 446 480 486 432 2,824
Mean Std. Dev. N
Firm-Level Variables
Lagged Dollar Debt .104  (.152)  2824
Lagged Total Debt .440  (.274)  2824
Lagged Short-Term Debt .264  (.217)  2812
Fixed-Capital Investment .071  (.099)  2824
Inventory Investment .009  (.051)  2810
Earnings (EBITDA) .106  (.101)  2802
Change in Total Debt .065  (.197)  2824
Interest Accrued .057  (.079)  2789
Macro Variables
∆ Log Real Exchange Rate .000  (.155) 2824
Inflow of Credit (% nominal GDP) .024  (.026)  2749
∆ Log Bank Credit .054  (.172) 2824
∆ Log Sectoral Value Added .031 (.049) 2808
Micro/Macro Interactions
Dollar Debt x ( ∆ Log Real Exchange Rate  -.001  (.022) 2824
Total Debt x ( ∆ Log Real Exchange Rate  .005  (.059) 2824
Dollar Debt x ( Inflow of Credit ) .000  (.004)  2749
Total Debt x ( Inflow of Credit ) -.001  (.007)  2749
Dollar Debt x ( ∆ Log Bank Credit ) -.005  (.034) 2824
Total Debt x ( ∆ Log Bank Credit ) -.004  (.041) 2824
Lagged Dollar Indebtedness:
Exchange-Rate Movement: Appr. Depr. Appr. Depr.
Variables: .082 .064  .048 .068 
Change in Total Debt (.171)  (.215)  (.186)  (.218) 
[778] [634] [807] [605]
.047 .075  .044 .067 
Interest  Accrued (.071) (.116)  (.045) (.071) 
[766] [627] [794] [602]
.118 .083  .114 .102 
Earnings  (EBITDA) (.112) (.103)  (.096) (.085) 
[774] [624] [807] [597]
.075 .058  .072 .078 
Fixed-Capital  Investment (.092) (.082)  (.084) (.135) 
[778] [634] [807] [605]
.016 .005  .006 .007 
Inventory  Investment (.067) (.043)  (.041) (.046) 
[770] [630] [805] [605]
Table 1
Panel A: Number of Firms in Sample Per Country and Year
Year
Panel B: Descriptive Statisitics
 Sample Statistics
Panel A displays,per countryand year,the numberof firmsin the sample that have nonmissingdata on laggedforeign-currencydebt. In Panel B, "Firm-
level" variablesare contemporaneousunless otherwise indicated. All accountingvariables are converted to real (constant-peso)values and scaled by the
lagged real value of total firm assets. Macroeconomicvariables are from the current period (i.e., concurrent with the investment variables). The real
exchangerateis definedas the nominalexchangeratedividedbythe domesticCPI. Panel C displaysthe mean, the standarddeviation(in parentheses),and
numberof observations(in brackets). The accountingdataarethe pooledBloomberg/ Economaticasample,as describedin the text. Macrodataaredrawn
from various sources, principally International Financial Statistics.  For detailed sources and descriptions, see Section 2 and Appendix A.
Panel C: Comparisons




Dollar Debt x  0.285 * 0.264 0.285 * 0.257 0.185 0.191 *** 0.187 *** 0.172 *** 0.142 ** 0.056
( ∆ Log Real Exchange Rate) (0.161) (0.161) (0.162) (0.157) (0.181) (0.061) (0.062) (0.060) (0.060) (0.054)
Total Debt x  0.043 0.029 0.046 ** 0.061 ***
( ∆ Log Real Exchange Rate) (0.057) (0.061) (0.020) (0.023)
Controls:
Dollar Debt  0.016 0.035 ** 0.018 0.023 0.010 -0.025 *** -0.022 ** -0.009 -0.003 -0.001
(0.015) (0.016) (0.017) (0.019) (0.020) (0.009) (0.009) (0.008) (0.009) (0.009)
Total Debt -0.030 *** -0.024 ** -0.030 *** -0.016 -0.005 * -0.011 *** -0.018 *** -0.024 ***
(0.009) (0.009) (0.010) (0.011) (0.003) (0.004) (0.005) (0.006)
Lagged Dependent Variable 0.499 *** 0.036 ***
(0.045) (0.014)
Peso Debt x (∆ Log CPI) Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Regression Statistics:
N 2830 2830 2830 2830 2288 2994 2994 2994 2994 2295
R
2 0.04 0.05 0.05 0.05 0.15 0.06 0.06 0.06 0.07 0.07
Interactions
Dollar Debt x  0.244 0.235 0.240 0.292 0.212 0.217 *** 0.216 *** 0.217 *** 0.269 *** 0.270 ***
( ∆ Log Real Exchange Rate) (0.173) (0.174) (0.167) (0.189) (0.177) (0.048) (0.048) (0.048) (0.056) (0.056)
Total Debt x  -0.079 -0.012 -0.079 * -0.082
( ∆ Log Real Exchange Rate) (0.115) (0.132) (0.045) (0.045)
Controls:
Dollar Debt  -0.019 0.003 -0.004 -0.005 -0.010 -0.010 -0.009 -0.009 -0.011 -0.010
(0.032) (0.036) (0.029) (0.030) (0.030) (0.008) (0.008) (0.009) (0.009) (0.009)
Total Debt -0.032 ** -0.030 ** -0.030 ** -0.011 -0.002 -0.001 0.000 0.000
(0.014) (0.013) (0.013) (0.014) (0.004) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005)
Lagged Dependent Variable 0.578 *** 0.023
(0.104) (0.050)
Peso Debt x (∆ Log CPI) Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Regression Statistics:
N 2092 2092 2092 2092 2037 2151 2151 2151 2151 2150
R




Panel B: Dependent Variables from the Following Year
Panel A: Dependent Variables from the Current Year
Capital Expenditures
Effect of Dollar Debt and Exchange Rate Movements on Investment
Each columnreportsthe resultsof an OLS regression. The dependent variables are as indicated above each column. Estimates of the effect of the independent variables are
listed in each row. Also included in each regression are indicator variables for each country-year cell. Huber-White standard errors are given in parentheses. A single
asterisk denotes statistical significance at the 90% level of confidence; double, 95%; triple, 99%. The number of observations varies because of data availability. Firm-
level independent variables are once-lagged values. All accounting variables are scaled by the lag of total firm assets. Macroeconomic variables (real exchange rate and
CPI) are from the current period. The real exchange rate is defined as as nominal exchange rate over domestic CPI. The accounting data are from the pooled
Bloomberg/Economatica database, as described in the text. Macro data are drawn from the International Financial Statistics of the IMF. For detailed sources and
descriptions, see Section 2. (1)  (2)  (3)  (4)
Period for dependent variable: (t) (t+1) (t) (t+1)
Independent Variables:
Dollar Debt x  0.185  0.212  0.056  0.270  ***
( ∆ Log Real Exchange Rate) (0.181) (0.177) (0.054) (0.056)
Dollar Debt x  0.206  0.092  0.034  0.231  ***
( ∆ Log Real Exchange Rate) (0.209) (0.161) (0.056) (0.056)
Total Assets x  -0.005  0.030  ** 0.005 0.010  **
( ∆ Log Real Exchange Rate) (0.010) (0.015) (0.005) (0.005)
Dollar Debt x  0.251  0.255  0.040  0.236  ***
( ∆ Log Real Exchange Rate) (0.184) (0.245) (0.066) (0.064)
Total Debt x  -0.695  -0.685  0.551  0.454 
Net Capital Inflows (0.813) (1.242) (0.409) (0.323)
Dollar Debt x  1.026  0.373  -0.191  -0.319 
Net Capital Inflows (0.918) (1.721) (0.503) (0.417)
Dollar Debt x  0.207  0.346  0.072  0.270  ***
( ∆ Log Real Exchange Rate) (0.192) (0.268) (0.053) (0.062)
Total Debt x  -0.037  0.149  0.103  *** 0.052 
∆ log Domestic Bank Credit (0.068) (0.148) (0.035) (0.038)
Dollar Debt x  -0.030  -0.292  -0.142  *** -0.016 
∆ log Domestic Bank Credit (0.076) (0.249) (0.045) (0.047)
Dollar Debt x  0.234  0.165  0.054  0.253  ***
( ∆ Log Real Exchange Rate) (0.210) (0.189) (0.054) (0.055)
Short Term Debt x  0.203  -0.194  -0.011  -0.063 
( ∆ Log Real Exchange Rate) (0.185) (0.225) (0.045) (0.081)
Dollar Debt x  0.199  0.198  0.030  0.256  ***
( ∆ Log Real Exchange Rate) (0.191) (0.180) (0.055) (0.057)
Short Term Debt x  -0.093  0.010  0.093  ** 0.046 
∆ log Domestic Bank Credit (0.061) (0.090) (0.039) (0.041)
Short Term Debt x  -0.418  0.625  0.952  ** 0.385 
Net Capital Inflows (0.797) (0.862) (0.476) (0.299)




Panel D: Interactions with Banking Sector
Panel A : Basic Specification
Panel B: Firm Size
Inventory Investment
Robustness Of Main Results
Panel C: Interactions with Capital Flows
Each panel presents the results from a different estimator. The dependent variablesare as indicated above each column. Estimates of the effect
of dollar debt x changes in the real exchange rate and selected independent variablesare reported in each panel . Independent variables in each
regression are as in Table 2, Column 5, however reporting of the rest of the estimates is supressed. A single asterisk denotes statistical
significanceat the 90% levelof confidence; double, 95%; triple,99%. The number of observations variesbecause of data availability.Firm-level
independent variables are once-lagged values. All accounting variables are scaled by the lag of total firm assets. The macroeconomic variables
are from the current period.
The realexchange rate is defined as as nominal exchange rate over domestic CPI. Net capitalinflows are the net financialaccount. Bank credit is
private sector loans by the domestic banking system. International prices are trade weighted averages of trading partner price levels in dollars.
The accounting data are from the Bloomberg/Economatic database, as described in the text. Macro data are drawn from the International
Financial Statistics of the IMF.  For detailed sources and descriptions, see Section 2. 
Panel E: Maturity vs Currency
Panel F: Maturity vs Currency II (1)  (2)  (3)  (4)
Period for dependent variable: (t) (t+1) (t) (t+1)
Independent Variables:
Dollar Debt x  0.189  0.213  0.063  0.258  ***
( ∆ Log Real Exchange Rate) (0.179) (0.175) (0.051) (0.056)
Lagged Earnings x  0.075  -0.094  0.116  -0.257  *
( ∆ Log Real Exchange Rate) (0.446) (0.356) (0.096) (0.154)
Dollar Debt x  0.142  0.216  0.032  0.258  ***
( ∆ Log Real Exchange Rate) (0.184) (0.191) (0.052) (0.055)
I(Has Parent) -0.013  0.167  ** -0.002 -0.005 
( ∆ Log Real Exchange Rate) (0.089) (0.080) (0.020) (0.025)
I(Has ADR) -0.038  0.069  * 0.011 -0.020 
( ∆ Log Real Exchange Rate) (0.036) (0.039) (0.014) (0.020)
I(Auditor is Bix Six) 0.058  * 0.045 0.019 0.062  ***
( ∆ Log Real Exchange Rate) (0.033) (0.037) (0.013) (0.020)
Dollar Debt x  0.169  0.238  0.034  0.259  ***
( ∆ Log Real Exchange Rate) (0.144) (0.180) (0.058) (0.062)
Total Debt x Dollar Debt x  0.063  -0.206  0.095  0.074 
( ∆ Log Real Exchange Rate) (0.385) (0.494) (0.132) (0.178)
Dollar Debt x  0.323  -0.142  0.051  0.183  **
( ∆ Log Real Exchange Rate) (0.313) (0.191) (0.079) (0.085)
I(Appreciation) x Dollar Debt x  -0.331  0.804  * 0.018 0.200 
( ∆ Log Real Exchange Rate) (0.419) (0.424) (0.163) (0.163)
Dollar Debt x  0.175  0.232  0.044  0.248  ***
( ∆ Log Real Exchange Rate) (0.185) (0.190) (0.055) (0.059)
Dollar Debt x  -0.167  0.539  -0.193  -0.569 
( ∆ Log Real Exchange Rate) (0.286) (0.682) (0.211) (0.504)
Robustness Of Main Results
Panel K: Controling for International Prices
Panel J: Appreciation vs Depreciation
Panel I: Non Linear effect of Debt
Panel G: Lagged Earnings
Panel H: Ownership & Information
Table 3 (Continued) 
Dependent Variables:
Capital Expenditures Inventory Investment (1)  (2)  (3)  (4)
Period for dependent variable: (t) (t+1) (t) (t+1)
Independent Variables:
Dollar Debt x  0.185  * 0.212 0.056 0.270  ***
( ∆ Log Real Exchange Rate) (0.105) (0.196) (0.050) (0.064)
Dollar  Debt  x  0.185 0.212 0.056 0.270  ***
( ∆ Log Real Exchange Rate) (0.181) (0.177) (0.054) (0.056)
Dollar  Debt  x  0.185 0.212 0.056 0.270  ***
( ∆ Log Real Exchange Rate) (0.157) (0.196) (0.067) (0.048)
Dollar  Debt  x  0.185 0.212 0.056 0.270  ***
( ∆ Log Real Exchange Rate) (0.184) (0.183) (0.056) (0.060)
Dollar  Debt  x  0.185 0.176 0.068 0.264  ***
( ∆ Log Real Exchange Rate) (0.157) (0.188) (0.057) (0.057)
Dollar Debt x  0.204  0.206  -0.159  0.326  ***
( ∆ Log Real Exchange Rate) (0.203) (0.182) (0.281) (0.091)
Dollar Debt x  0.257  0.292  0.142  ** 0.269  ***
( ∆ Log Real Exchange Rate) (0.157) (0.189) (0.060) (0.056)
Dollar  Debt  x  0.043 0.042 0.057 0.285  ***
( ∆ Log Real Exchange Rate) (0.113) (0.137) (0.060) (0.064)
Dollar  Debt  x  0.090 0.067 0.084 0.284  ***
( ∆ Log Real Exchange Rate) (0.119) (0.148) (0.063) (0.067)
Dollar Debt x  0.014  0.104  -0.030  0.304  ***
( ∆ Log Real Exchange Rate) (0.109) (0.166) (0.048) (0.071)
Estimated AR(1) Coefficient 0.174  0.165  0.008  -0.021 
Panel C: OLS, baseline, errors clustered on country x year
Panel J: Firm fixed effects, AR(1) error
Panel G: OLS, no LDV, Huber-White standard errors.
Panel H: Firm fixed effects, Huber-White standard errors
Panel I: Matching with firm fixed effects and Huber-White standard errors
Panel F: IV estimator using twice lagged dependet variable as instrument for lagged 
dependent variable
Alternative Estimators
Each panel presents the resultsfrom a different estimator. The dependent variablesare as indicated above each column. Estimatesof the effect of
dollar debt x changes in the real exchange rate are reported in each panel. Independent variablesin each regressionare as in Table 2, Column 5,
however reporting of the rest of the estimatesis supressed. The exceptionsare panels G-I that excludethe laggeddependent variable,as in Table2,
Column 4. A singleasteriskdenotes statisticalsignificanceat the 90% levelof confidence; double, 95%; triple, 99%. The number of observations
varies because of data availability.Firm-levelindependent variablesare once-laggedvalues. All accounting variablesare scaled by the lag of total
firm assets. The macroeconomic variables (real exchange and CPI) are from the current period. The accounting data are from the
Bloomberg/Economatica database, as describedin the text. Macro data are drawn from the InternationalFinancialStatisticsof the IMF. For detailed
sources and descriptions, see Section 2. 





Panel D: OLS, errors clustered by firm
Panel A: OLS, baseline, Gauss-Markov standard errors
Panel B: OLS, baseline,  Huber-White "robust" standard errors




Dollar Debt x  0.000 0.310 * 0.381 ** 0.495 ** 0.125 -0.002 0.029 -0.024
( ∆ Log Real Exchange Rate) (0.141) (0.176) (0.188) (0.240) (0.102) (0.107) (0.123) (0.170)
Total Debt x  -0.495 * -0.494 * -0.587 0.200 ** 0.205 * 0.300
( ∆ Log Real Exchange Rate) (0.270) (0.286) (0.395) (0.094) (0.109) (0.172)
Dollar Debt x  1.847 * 0.758
Net Capital Inflows (1.029) (1.069)
Total Debt x  -0.003 0.154
Net Capital Inflows (1.032) (1.050)
Controls:
Dollar Debt  0.067 *** 0.077 *** 0.083 *** 0.036 0.288 ** 0.027 -0.055 ** -0.059 ** -0.056 ** -0.016 -0.028 -0.016
(0.022) (0.023) (0.025) (0.033) (0.123) (0.034) (0.025) (0.024) (0.023) (0.054) (0.070) (0.056)
Total Debt -0.113 *** -0.127 *** -0.128 *** -0.114 ** -0.414 ** -0.104 ** 0.033 * 0.038 * 0.038 ** 0.005 0.158 ** 0.000
(0.021) (0.025) (0.026) (0.047) (0.203) (0.048) (0.020) (0.020) (0.019) (0.064) (0.063) (0.066)
Regression Statistics:
N 635 635 635 139 66 73 674 674 674 144 69 75
R
2 0.10 0.12 0.12 0.16 0.08 0.09 0.07 0.08 0.08 0.19 0.12 0.00
Interactions
Dollar Debt x  0.096 0.296 0.438 0.140 0.227 *** 0.269 *** 0.220 *** 0.212 *
( ∆ Log Real Exchange Rate) (0.169) (0.220) (0.305) (0.172) (0.058) (0.080) (0.085) (0.111)
Total Debt x  -0.319 -0.496 * -0.377 -0.066 -0.013 -0.041
( ∆ Log Real Exchange Rate) (0.221) (0.286) (0.299) (0.082) (0.085) (0.106)
Dollar Debt x  3.912 -1.335 *
Net Capital Inflows (2.912) (0.732)
Total Debt x  -4.885 1.453 **
Net Capital Inflows (3.377) (0.738)
Controls:
Dollar Debt  -0.006 -0.003 0.006 0.052 0.124 0.050 -0.011 -0.010 -0.013 0.023 0.131 *** 0.019
(0.085) (0.084) (0.079) (0.049) (0.075) (0.051) (0.016) (0.016) (0.016) (0.032) (0.048) (0.033)
Total Debt -0.083 -0.087 -0.096 -0.091 -0.284 ** -0.084 -0.013 -0.014 -0.011 -0.043 * -0.064 -0.042
(0.065) (0.064) (0.062) (0.085) (0.131) (0.088) (0.015) (0.015) (0.015) (0.026) (0.049) (0.027)
Regression Statistics:
N 528 528 528 125 57 68 539 539 539 126 58 68
R




Panel B: Dependent Variables from the Following Year
Panel A: Dependent Variables from the Current Year
Capital Expenditures
Effects of Tequila Crisis in Mexican Firms
This tablereports the OLS estimatesfor the sub-sampleof Mexicanfirms. Columns1,2 and 7,8 containestimatesof equation(7) in the text. Columns C and D report estimatesof the indicated
debt variables. Robust standard errors are reported in parentheses. A singleasteriskdenotes statisticalsignificanceat the 90% levelof confidence; double, 95%; triple, 99%. The dependent
variableisinvestmentin fixedcapital. Firm-levelindependentvariablesare once-laggedvalues,exceptfor contemporaneousearnings. Allaccountingvariablesare scaled by the lagof totalfirm
assets. The real exchange rate is from the current period (i.e., concurrent with the LHS investmentvariable) and is defined as the nominal exchange rate divided by the domestic CPI. The
accounting data are from the Bloomberg sample, as described in the text. Macro data are drawn from varioussources, principallyInternationalFinancialStatistics. For detailed sources and




Dollar Debt x  0.002 -0.004 -0.003 -0.002 0.005 * 0.001 0.001 0.004
(Unexpected ∆ Log Real Exchange Rate) (0.007) (0.007) (0.007) (0.007) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003)
Total Debt x  -0.001 -0.001 0.001 0.001 -0.002 -0.002 -0.002 0.000
(Ex-post Real Peso Rate) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.002)
Dollar Debt x  0.266 0.233 0.159 0.182 *** 0.183 *** 0.072
( ∆ Log Real Exchange Rate) (0.173) (0.168) (0.193) (0.068) (0.070) (0.056)
Controls
Dollar Debt  0.042 ** 0.043 ** 0.048 *** 0.025 -0.024 ** -0.023 ** -0.024 ** -0.018 *
(0.017) (0.017) (0.018) (0.018) (0.009) (0.009) (0.011) (0.009)
Total Debt -0.030 *** -0.029 *** -0.037 *** -0.024 *** -0.007 ** -0.006 ** -0.006 -0.014 ***
(0.009) (0.009) (0.008) (0.008) (0.003) (0.003) (0.005) (0.005)
Total Debt x  0.060 0.059 -0.002 0.025
( ∆ Log Real Exchange Rate) (0.050) (0.054) (0.022) (0.021)
Lagged Dependent Variable 0.505 *** 0.035 **
(0.045) (0.014)
Regression Statistics:
N 2727 2727 2727 2278 2835 2835 2835 2285
R
2 0.04 0.05 0.05 0.15 0.05 0.06 0.06 0.06
 
Interactions
Dollar Debt x  0.009 0.005 0.004 0.008 0.006 * 0.001 0.000 0.000
(Unexpected ∆ Log Real Exchange Rate) (0.010) (0.012) (0.012) (0.014) (0.003) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004)
Total Debt x  0.003 0.003 0.002 0.005 0.002 0.002 0.001 0.001
(Ex-post Real Peso Rate) (0.003) (0.003) (0.005) (0.006) (0.001) (0.001) (0.002) (0.002)
Dollar Debt x  0.219 0.239 0.143 0.222 *** 0.251 *** 0.252 ***
( ∆ Log Real Exchange Rate) (0.194) (0.243) (0.220) (0.052) (0.060) (0.060)
Controls -0.002 0.002 0.001 -0.017 -0.012 -0.008 -0.009 -0.009
Dollar Debt  (0.036) (0.035) (0.036) (0.038) (0.009) (0.009) (0.009) (0.009)
-0.033 ** -0.033 ** -0.033 ** -0.010 -0.003 -0.002 -0.001 -0.001
Total Debt (0.014) (0.014) (0.015) (0.017) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.005)
-0.033 0.067 -0.047 -0.050
Total Debt x  (0.181) (0.174) (0.052) (0.052)
( ∆ Log Real Exchange Rate)
0.578 *** 0.024
Lagged Dependent Variable (0.101) (0.051)
Regression Statistics:
N 2071 2071 2071 2025 2118 2118 2118 2117
R
2 0.03 0.03 0.03 0.15 0.06 0.07 0.07 0.07




Panel A: Dependent Variables from the Current Year
Inventory Investment
Effects of Expected and Unexpected Exchange Rate Movements
Each column reports the results of an OLS regression. The dependent variables are as indicated above each column. Estimates of the effect of the independent variables are listed in each row. Also
included in each regression are indicator variables for each country-year cell. Huber-White standard errors are given in parentheses. A single asterisk denotes statistical significance at the 90% level
of confidence; double, 95%; triple, 99%. The number of observations varies because of data availability. Firm-level independent variables are once-lagged values. All accounting variables are scaled
by the lag of total firm assets. Macroeconomic variables (real exchange rate and CPI) are from the current period. The real exchange rate is defined as as nominal exchange rate over domestic CPI.
Unexpected depreciations are calculated as the difference between realized depreciations and the expected depreciation implicit in the difference between dollar and peso interest rates. Real peso
interest rates are calculated as the nominal peso rate minus ex-post inflation. The accounting data are from the pooled Bloomberg/Economatica database, as described in the text. Macro data are
drawn from the International Financial Statistics of the IMF.  For detailed sources and descriptions, see Section 2.  (1)  (2)  (3)  (4)
Period for dependent variable (t) (t+1) (t) (t+1)
Independent Variables
Dollar Debt x  2.961  22.902  0.705  -1.944 
( ∆ Log Real Exchange Rate) (15.119) (42.237) (0.621) (7.410)
Dollar Debt x  0.419  ** 0.229 0.200  *** 0.157 
( ∆ Log Real Exchange Rate) (0.175) (0.343) (0.074) (0.122)
Dollar Debt x  0.280 1.087 -0.436 0.565
( ∆ Log Real Exchange Rate) (1.734) (2.167) (0.817) (0.613)
Dollar  Debt  x  2.045 5.880 0.052 0.696 
( ∆ Log Real Exchange Rate) (1.604) (5.820) (0.554) (0.967)
Dollar Debt x  0.317  ** 0.305 0.057 0.309  ***







Each panel presents the results for an individual country. The dependent variables are as indicated above each column. Estimates of the
effect of dollar debt x changes in the real exchange rate are reported in each panel. Independent variables in each regression are as in Table
2, Column 5, however reporting of the rest of the estimates is supressed. A single asterisk denotes statistical significance at the 90% level of
confidence; double, 95%; triple, 99%. The number of observationsvaries because of data availability. Firm-level independent variables are
once-lagged values. All accounting variables are scaled by the lag of total firm assets. The macroeconomic variables (real exchange and
CPI) are from the current period. The accounting data are from the Bloomberg/Economatica database, as described in the text. Macro data




Capital Expenditures (1)  (2)  (3)  (4)
Period for dependent variable: (t) (t+1) (t) (t+1)
Independent Variables:
Dollar Debt x  0.257  *** 0.292 0.142  *** 0.269  ***
( ∆ Log Real Exchange Rate) (0.098) (0.203) (0.049) (0.064)
Dollar Debt x  0.205  ** 0.200 0.097  ** 0.221  ***
( ∆ Log Real Exchange Rate) (0.097) (0.198) (0.047) (0.061)
Contemporaneous Sales 0.129  *** 0.207  *** 0.113  *** 0.105  ***
(0.021) (0.035) (0.010) (0.011)
Contemporaneous Costs -0.112  *** -0.181  *** -0.097  *** -0.095  ***
(0.022) (0.036) (0.011) (0.011)
Dollar Debt x  0.217  0.136  0.019  0.236  ***
( ∆ Log Real Exchange Rate) (0.159) (0.173) (0.050) (0.057)
Contemporaneous Sales 0.173  ** 0.293  ** 0.162  *** 0.168  ***
(0.074) (0.132) (0.025) (0.025)
Contemporaneous Costs -0.162  ** -0.270  ** -0.163  *** -0.168  ***
(0.075) (0.135) (0.026) (0.025)
Panel C: Control for Sales and Costs (IV)
Panel A : Basic Specification
Panel B: Control for Sales and Costs (OLS)
Controls for Competitiveness
This table reports the OLS estimatesof equation (7) in the text. Robust (Huber-White) standard errors are reported in parentheses. A single
asterisk denotesstatisticalsignificanceat the 90% level of confidence;double, 95%; triple, 99%. The number of observationsvaries because
of data availability. The dependent variable is as indicated above. Firm-level independent variables are once-lagged values, except for
contemporaneoussales and costs. Excluded instrumentsin Panel C consistof interactionsof ISIC2 dummies and export-to-assetsratios with
the change in the real exchange rate. (First-order effects of ISIC2 and exports are added in Panel C as included instruments.)  
All accounting variables are scaled by the lag of total firm assets. Macroeconomicvariables (real exchangerate, sectorial value added, and
CPI) are from the current period (i.e., concurrent with the LHS investment variable). The real exchange rate is defined as the nominal
exchange rate divided by the domestic CPI. The accounting data are the pooled Bloomberg / Economatica sample, as describedin the text.
Macro data are drawn from various sources. For detailed sources and descriptions, see Section 2.
Table 8 
Capital Expenditures Inventory Investment
Dependent Variables:Independent Variables (1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Indicators of Sensitivity of Profits
  to the Real Exchange Rate
  Dummy for Tradeable Sector 0.054 *** 0.045 *** 0.065 *** 0.059 ***
(0.008) (0.008) (0.008) (0.008)
  Elasticity of Own-Sector Value 0.448 *** 0.299 ***
   Added to Real Exchange Rate (0.076) (0.047)
  Dummy for International Operations 0.098 ***
(0.016)
Controls
  Log Assets 0.047 *** 0.042 *** 0.044 *** 0.046 *** 0.043 ***
(0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002)
  Dummy if Has Parent Company -0.021 **
(0.009)
Regression Statistics
N 3419 3419 3421 3242 3242
R
2 0.43 0.43 0.43 0.40 0.41
Table 9 
Full Sample Sample with Ownership Data
 Determinants of Currency Composition of Debt
This table reportsthe OLS estimatesof equation (10) in the text. Specificationalso includes(country x year) fixedeffects. Standard errors adjusted for clusteringby
firm are reportedin parentheses. A single asterisk denotesstatisticalsignificanceat the 90% level of confidence;double, 95%; triple, 99%. The dependentvariable is
the fraction of debt denominated in foreign currency. "Full sample" is pooled Bloomberg/Economaticadata described in the text. "Sample with ownership data"
consistsof the Bloomberg sample with nonmissingownershipdata. The elasticity of sectorial value added to the real exchange rate was computed using data from
1980 through 1999. The variable on international operations is an indicator constructed by searching in the Bloomberg company profile for referencesto foreign
subsidiaries or other activities abroad. The indicator variable for whether the firm has a parent company was constructed by examining current ownership and the
history of large share transactions. This variable is coded as one if firms had a parent company prior to their first appearance in the sample. For detailed sourcesand
descriptions, see Section 2Dependent Variables
Sales Earnings Earnings (t+1)
Independent Variables (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Interaction Effect
Dollar Debt x 2.616 *** 0.219 ** 0.355 *** 0.350 *** 0.331 *** 0.248 ***
 (∆ Log Real Exchange Rate) (0.528) (0.100) (0.099) (0.098) (0.096) (0.078)
Main Effects
Total Debt 0.574 *** -0.036 *** -0.045 *** -0.040 *** -0.040 *** -0.021 **
(0.080) (0.012) (0.012) (0.012) (0.012) (0.009)
Dollar Debt -1.079 *** -0.004 0.007 0.003 0.006 0.011
(0.099) (0.015) (0.016) (0.016) (0.016) (0.012)
Controls
Total Debt x -1.774 *** -0.045 -0.100 -0.134 -0.141 0.017
 (∆ Log Real Exchange Rate) (0.301) (0.082) (0.109) (0.112) (0.112) (0.061)
Fixed-Capital Investment 0.185 *** 0.173 ***
   (period t) (0.025) (0.025)
Inventory Investment 0.126 ***
   (period t) (0.041)
Earnings (period t) 0.637 ***
(0.022)
Regression Statistics
N 2883 2807 2514 2368 2359 2359
R
2 0.093 0.107 0.096 0.116 0.121 0.121
Table 10 
 Effect of Dollar Debt and Exchange-Rate Movements on Firm Income
This table contains OLS estimates of equation (7) in the text. The dependent variables are as indicated above. Standard errors adjusted for clustering by (countryx
year) are reported in parentheses. A single asterisk denotes statistical significance at the 90% level of confidence; double, 95%; triple, 99%. The dependent
variables are as indicated above. Firm-level independent variables are once-lagged values, except as indicated. All accounting variables are scaled by the lag of
total firm assets. "Sales" are the firm's sales revenue for the current year. "Earnings" are the firm's current-year earnings before interest, depreciation, and taxes
(EBITDA). "Earnings (t+1)" are the firm's EBITDA for the succeeding year. Macroeconomic variables are from the current period. The real exchange ratei s
defined as the nominal exchange rate divided by the domestic CPI. The accounting data are the pooled Bloomberg/Economatica sample described in the text.
Macro data are drawn from various sources, principally International Financial Statistics.  For detailed sources and descriptions, see Section 2.Dependent Variables
Change in Accrued
Debt Debt Change Debt less Interest Change in Debt
Level Level in Debt New Issues Charges plus Interest
Independent Variables (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Interaction Effect
Dollar Debt x 1.118 *** 1.442 *** 1.118 *** 1.514 *** 0.159 1.280 ***
 (∆ Log Real Exchange Rate) (0.151) (0.205) (0.151) (0.219) (0.162) (0.181)
Main Effects
Peso Debt 1.055 *** 0.972 *** 0.055 -0.042 0.198 *** 0.252 ***
(0.036) (0.040) (0.036) (0.054) (0.018) (0.053)
Dollar Debt 0.870 *** 0.855 *** -0.130 *** -0.151 *** 0.111 *** -0.019
(0.033) (0.028) (0.033) (0.032) (0.016) (0.040)
 (∆ Log Real Exchange Rate) 0.038 0.013 0.038 0.005 0.042 0.082
(0.088) (0.090) (0.088) (0.089) (0.027) (0.088)
Controls
Total Debt x -0.440 *** -1.039 *** -0.440 *** -1.217 *** 0.111 ** -0.332 **
 (∆ Log Real Exchange Rate) (0.118) (0.136) (0.118) (0.203) (0.052) (0.166)
New Issues of Debt 0.684 ***
(0.144)
Regression Statistics
N 3003 2815 3003 2815 2918 2918
R
2 0.675 0.693 0.041 0.193 0.528 0.098
Table 11  
Dollar Debt and Exchange-Rate: Effect on Firm Liabilities
This table contains OLS estimates of equation (7) in the text. The dependent variables, variousfirm liabilities, are as indicated above. Specification also includes
country fixed effects, D Log CPI, the interaction of the two with peso debt, and all relevent main effects. Standard errors adjusted for clustering by (country x
year) are reported in parentheses. A single asterisk denotes statistical significance at the 90% level of confidence; double, 95%; triple, 99%. The dependent
variables are as indicated above. Firm-level independent variables are once-lagged values, except for new issues of debt. All accounting variables are scaled by
the lag of total firm assets. Macroeconomic variables are from the current period. The real exchange rate is defined as the nominal exchange rate divided by the
domestic CPI. The accounting data are the pooled Bloomberg/Economaticasample described in the text. Macro data are drawn fromvarious sources,principally
the International Financial Statistics of the IMF.  For detailed sources and descriptions, see Section 2. Estimated
Sign of Effect of
Effect on (Dollar Debt Source for
Net Worth times RER) Estimate
Current Period
Debt (-) 1.118 Table 11, Col. 3
Debt Service (-) 0.159 Table 11, Col. 5
Earnings (+) 0.219 Table 10, Col. 2
Subtotal -1.058
Future Periods
Earnings (period t+1) (+) 0.331 Table 10, Col. 5
Table 12  
Estimated Changes in Selected Dependent Variables
Did Firm Net Worth Actually Decline?Brazil 1999 -8% 0%
Chile 1999 -19% -19%
Colombia 1999 68% -36%





Gross Fixed Private 
Capital Formation
 Sample and Aggregate Investment: Selected  Episodes
Sample capital expediture is the weigthed % change of capital expenditures for a
sample of firms from Bloomberg and Economatica. Gross Fixed Private Capital
Formation is from National Account data, published in the WEO. For comparability,
firm and aggregate data are deflated by end-of-period CPI. Depreciation is the annual
% change of end of the end of period real exchange rate, defined as the nominal local
currency/US dollar exchange rate over the domestic CPI. (1)  (2)  (3)  (4)  (5)  (6)  (7)  (8)  (9)  (10)  (11)  (12)
Period for dependent var: (t) (t+1) (t) (t+1) (t) (t+1) (t) (t+1) (t) (t+1) (t) (t+1)
Independent Variables:
Dollar Debt x  0.257  0.292  0.142  ** 0.269  *** 0.204 0.206  -0.159 0.326  *** 0.043 0.042 0.057  0.285  ***
 (∆ Log Real Exchange Rate) (0.157) (0.189) (0.060) (0.056) (0.203) (0.182) (0.281) (0.091) (0.113) (0.137) (0.060) (0.064)
Dollar Debt x  0.255  0.188  0.128  * 0.230  *** 0.207 0.105  -0.129 0.273  *** 0.067 -0.097  0.050  0.249  ***
 (∆ Log Real Exchange Rate) (0.176) (0.175) (0.067) (0.056) (0.233) (0.178) (0.213) (0.090) (0.125) (0.111) (0.065) (0.061)
Total Assets x  0.001  0.027  * 0.004 0.010  ** -0.001 0.024  -0.004 0.013  -0.008 0.019 0.001  0.006 
 (∆ Log Real Exchange Rate) (0.009) (0.014) (0.005) (0.005) (0.011) (0.017) (0.017) (0.009) (0.008) (0.013) (0.005) (0.006)
Dollar Debt x  0.300  * 0.379 0.199  *** 0.235  *** 0.316 0.213  -0.155 0.317  *** 0.125 0.020 0.108  0.260  ***
 (∆ Log Real Exchange Rate) (0.155) (0.270) (0.077) (0.064) (0.204) (0.229) (0.226) (0.119) (0.124) (0.132) (0.076) (0.072)
Total  Debt  x  -0.369  -0.972  -0.340  0.464 -1.395 -0.411 -0.229  0.028 -0.655 -0.487 -0.483  0.453 
Net Capital Inflows (0.690) (1.165) (0.381) (0.321) (1.222) (1.332) (1.282) (0.783) (0.670) (0.790) (0.382) (0.343)
Dollar Debt x  0.716  0.897  0.903  * -0.315  1.583 -0.182 -0.077 -0.131  1.342 -0.524  0.836  -0.193 
Net Capital Inflows (0.774) (1.661) (0.518) (0.417) (1.286) (1.625) (1.123) (0.775) (0.817) (0.982) (0.566) (0.486)
Dollar Debt x  0.293  * 0.400 0.168  *** 0.270  *** 0.246 0.330  -0.118 0.279  *** 0.056 0.034 0.088  0.267  ***
 (∆ Log Real Exchange Rate) (0.168) (0.271) (0.061) (0.062) (0.217) (0.257) (0.260) (0.094) (0.121) (0.164) (0.058) (0.069)
Total Debt x  -0.036  0.112  0.116  *** 0.053 -0.104  0.156  0.084 -0.046 -0.006 -0.034  0.079  ** 0.001 
∆ log Domestic Bank Credit (0.058) (0.146) (0.041) (0.037) (0.091) (0.150) (0.069) (0.090) (0.061) (0.088) (0.039) (0.042)
Dollar Debt x  -0.074  -0.242  -0.175  *** -0.018 0.005  -0.285  -0.216  ** 0.101 -0.031  0.026 -0.149  *** 0.034 
∆ log Domestic Bank Credit (0.069) (0.243) (0.057) (0.046) (0.103) (0.248) (0.094) (0.111) (0.070) (0.121) (0.049) (0.053)
Dollar Debt x  0.279  * 0.292 0.059 0.258  *** 0.220 0.212  -0.244 0.328  *** 0.024 0.034  -0.010  0.271  ***
 (∆ Log Real Exchange Rate) (0.168) (0.184) (0.048) (0.056) (0.202) (0.181) (0.682) (0.126) (0.120) (0.138) (0.051) (0.065)
Lagged Earnings x  0.190  -0.162  0.116  -0.255  * 0.148 -0.020 -0.033 -0.317 -0.013 -0.239  0.011  -0.329 
 (∆ Log Real Exchange Rate) (0.436) (0.388) (0.091) (0.153) (0.576) (0.363) (0.310) (0.331) (0.274) (0.208) (0.097) (0.201)
Dollar Debt x  0.292  0.234  0.132  * 0.252  *** 0.250 0.171  -0.105 0.294  *** 0.066 -0.032  0.058  0.272  ***
 (∆ Log Real Exchange Rate) (0.180) (0.202) (0.060) (0.055) (0.232) (0.199) (0.202) (0.088) (0.129) (0.129) (0.060) (0.064)
Short  Term  Debt  x  0.170 -0.207 -0.044 -0.064 0.170  -0.146 0.010  -0.140 0.075  -0.297 0.012 -0.040 
 (∆ Log Real Exchange Rate) (0.169) (0.195) (0.040) (0.080) (0.190) (0.263) (0.074) (0.127) (0.146) (0.183) (0.043) (0.088)
Note: Table continues on next page.
Appendix B
IV for Lagged Dependent Var. OLS w/o LDV Firm Fixed Effects w/o LDV
Each panel presents the results from a different estimator. The dependent variables are as indicated above each column. Estimates of the effect of dollar debt x changes in the real exchange
rate and selected independent variables are reported in each panel . Independent variables in each regression are as in Table 4 panels F, G and H, however reporting of the rest of the
estimates is supressed. A single asterisk denotes statistical significance at the 90% level of confidence; double, 95%; triple, 99%. The number of observations varies because of data
availability. Firm-level independent variables are once-lagged values. All accounting variables are scaled by the lag of total firm assets. The macroeconomic variables (real exchange and
CPI) are from the current period. The accounting data are from the Bloomberg/Economatic database, as described in the text. Macro data are drawn from the International Financial
Statistics of the IMF. For detailed sources and descriptions, see Section 2. 
Panel C: Interactions with Capital Flows
Panel D: Interactions with Banking Sector
Panel E: Lagged Earnings




Panel A: Basic Specification










Expenditures (1)  (2)  (3)  (4)  (5)  (6)  (7)  (8)  (9)  (10)  (11)  (12)
Period for dependent var: (t) (t+1) (t) (t+1) (t) (t+1) (t) (t+1) (t) (t+1) (t) (t+1)
Independent Variables:
Dollar Debt x  0.356  ** 0.348 0.210  *** 0.229  *** 0.401 0.203  -0.086 0.264  ** 0.181 -0.033  0.121  0.267  ***
 (∆ Log Real Exchange Rate) (0.179) (0.301) (0.073) (0.065) (0.227) (0.267) (0.157) (0.109) (0.142) (0.135) (0.077) (0.073)
Total  Debt  x  -0.730  -1.738  -0.905  0.247 -2.096 -1.092 -0.903  0.573 -1.410 -1.355 -0.803  -0.061 
Net Capital Inflows (0.851) (1.518) (0.469) (0.427) (1.366) (1.509) (1.461) (0.676) (0.995) (1.037) (0.486) (0.500)
Dollar Debt x  0.901  1.142  1.137  ** -0.230 2.088 0.066 0.241  -0.362 1.688  * -0.385 0.959  * -0.002 
∆ log Domestic Bank Credit (0.776) (1.771) (0.499) (0.437) (1.292) (1.684) (1.121) (0.716) (0.901) (1.010) (0.592) (0.504)
Short Term Debt x  0.239  -0.095  * 0.032  -0.027  0.266 -0.043  0.135 -0.218  0.196 -0.167  0.050  0.030 
 (∆ Log Real Exchange Rate) (0.176) (0.222) (0.073) (0.093) (0.194) (0.276) (0.137) (0.146) (0.167) (0.187) (0.068) (0.101)
Dollar Debt x  0.208  0.261  0.132  ** 0.257  *** 0.159 0.216  -0.236 0.298  *** 0.012 0.032 0.057  0.272  ***
 (∆ Log Real Exchange Rate) (0.155) (0.202) (0.064) (0.055) (0.207) (0.201) (0.356) (0.091) (0.116) (0.146) (0.062) (0.064)
I(Has  Parent) 0.034 0.115 0.006  -0.006  0.020  0.203  ** -0.052 0.023  -0.032 0.060 0.000  0.002 
 (∆ Log Real Exchange Rate) (0.078) (0.085) (0.017) (0.025) (0.097) (0.097) (0.083) (0.041) (0.058) (0.068) (0.019) (0.029)
I(Has  ADR) -0.030  0.047  0.014  -0.018 -0.031  0.069 -0.034 -0.041 -0.048  0.003  0.018  -0.028 
 (∆ Log Real Exchange Rate) (0.036) (0.041) (0.017) (0.020) (0.036) (0.049) (0.068) (0.031) (0.037) (0.030) (0.016) (0.021)
I(Auditor is Bix Six) 0.065  * 0.083  ** 0.010 0.062  *** 0.076  ** 0.034 -0.046  0.065  ** 0.046 0.067  * -0.002 0.058  ***
 (∆ Log Real Exchange Rate) (0.035) (0.039) (0.013) (0.020) (0.037) (0.053) (0.093) (0.029) (0.034) (0.036) (0.014) (0.022)
Panel G: Maturity vs Currency II
Panel H: Ownership & Information
Appendix B (continued)
OLS w/o LDV IV for Lagged Dependent Var. Firm Fixed Effects w/o LDV
Dependent Variables:
Capital 
Expenditures
Inventory 
Investment
Capital 
Expenditures
Inventory 
Investment
Capital 
Expenditures
Inventory 
Investment